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Abstract
Contracts have proved to be an effective mechanism that helps developers in identifying
those modules of a program that violate the contracts of the functions and objects they use.
In recent years, sessions have been established as a key mechanism for realizing inter-module
communications in concurrent programs. Just like values flow into or out of a function or
object, messages are sent on, and received from, a session endpoint. Unlike conventional
functions and objects, however, the kind, direction, and properties of messages exchanged
in a session may vary over time, as the session progresses. This feature of sessions calls for
contracts that evolve along with the session they describe.
In this work, we extend to sessions the notion of chaperone contract (roughly, a contract
that applies to a mutable object) and investigate the ramifications of contract monitoring in a
higher-order language that features sessions. We give a characterization of a correct module,
one that honors the contracts of the sessions it uses, and prove a blame theorem. Guided
by the calculus, we describe a lightweight implementation of monitored sessions as an OCaml
module with which programmers can benefit from static session type checking and dynamic
contract monitoring using an off-the-shelf version of OCaml.
1 Introduction
The design-by-contract approach to software development Meyer [1992] promotes the usage of
executable specifications called contracts to describe the mutual obligations that regulate the
interaction between different modules. Contracts are embedded in code and checked at runtime to
help developers identify faulty modules. Findler and Felleisen [2002] have shown that this approach
is applicable also to languages with higher-order functions, despite the fact that checking whether
a function satisfies a given contract is undecidable. The key idea is to defer the evaluation of
the contract until the function is actually applied to its argument. At this point, the contract is
disassembled and used to perform or delay checks on the supplied argument and the returned result.
Specifying contracts for mutable objects poses additional problems, though, because checking
whether an object satisfies a given contract at a particular point in time does not guarantee that
the contract will be also satisfied later on, if the object is modified. To address these situations,
Strickland et al. [2012] introduced chaperone contracts, an interposition mechanism whereby the
object is protected by a proxy that exposes the same interface as the object and that takes actions
to perform or delay checks on the values flowing into or out of the object.
In this paper we introduce chaperone contracts for binary sessions, which are private communi-
cation channels between pairs of processes. Just like mutable objects have operations for inserting
and retrieving values, sessions have operations for sending and receiving messages. Unlike con-
ventional objects, though, the order in which these operations can be performed is disciplined by
a protocol specification called session type. Also, the type of exchanged messages may change
over time. For these reasons, sessions are more closely related to non-uniform objects Ravara and
Vasconcelos [2000], Gay et al. [2010], whose interface changes according to their state. Chaperone
contracts for sessions can be used to complement session types with precise specifications concern-
ing the content of messages and their relationship with the actual behavior of session participants.
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Compared to the functional contracts of Findler and Felleisen [2002] and chaperone contracts
of Strickland et al. [2012], the distinguishing feature of chaperone contracts for sessions is that
they evolve as the monitored session progresses: not only the contracts of messages exchanged in
the session may vary over time, but also the contract of the remainder of a session may depend
upon messages that have been exchanged earlier on in the same or a different session.
More in detail, here are the main contributions of this work:
• We define a core functional language called λCoS featuring runtime contract monitoring for
higher-order sessions in the style of Findler and Felleisen [2002] and Strickland et al. [2012].
Contracts are dynamically updated along with the session they monitor. We introduce a
novel semantics for contract monitoring, called big-step monitoring, that is instrumental to
the subsequent formal analysis of our monitoring system. The setting allows us to pinpoint
unexplored aspects of contract monitoring in a language with linear resources.
• We give an operational characterization of locally correct modules, namely modules that
honor the contracts of the sessions they use. We argue that this notion can help programmers
write correct code. We also prove a blame soundness result stating that correct modules
cannot be blamed even in the presence of buggy or malicious parties.
• Guided by λCoS, we implement chaperone contracts for sessions on top of an existing OCaml
library for binary sessions Padovani [2017]. The implementation also supports runtime con-
tract monitoring in the presence of higher-order sessions and its key aspects are portable to
other programming languages as well.
Although contracts for sessions and corresponding monitoring techniques have been actively
investigated (cf. Section 7), our proposal is the first one that follows the approach of Findler and
Felleisen [2002], which has well-known assets: contracts are first-class entities written in the same
language programmers are already accustomed to, they can be computed, passed as arguments,
and returned as results, they can be used gradually within large systems and can describe whole
protocols or just parts thereof. Also, monitoring is performed inline and requires no external tools
or dedicated middleware.
Structure of the paper. The next section gives an overview of the key ingredients of session
contracts and their usage. Although the section is informal, the given examples are “real” in the
sense that they run using our implementation. The formal model of λCoS is given in Section 3
and its typing discipline in Section 4. To keep the formalization technically manageable, we
make some simplifying assumptions on the operational semantics and the type system which are
relaxed in the implementation. Section 5 addresses local correctness and blame soundness. The
implementation is detailed in Section 6, whereas Section 7 discusses connections with related
work in more detail. Section 8 summarizes our work and hints at some extensions and future
developments. Supplementary technical material and proofs of the results presented in Sections 3–
6 can be found in the Appendix.
2 A Programmer’s Viewpoint of Contracts for Sessions
In this section we provide a programmer’s viewpoint of contracts for sessions using the process
networks depicted in Figure 1 as running examples. In these networks, the aim of module User is
to obtain an element w resulting from two elements v1, v2 produced by Source and combined by
Operator. For the sake of illustration, we assume that all the elements are integer numbers and
that w = v1 mod v2.
According to the network on the left-hand side of Figure 1, User establishes two sessions x and
y with Source and Operator respectively, it forwards every element vi received from x on y, and
receives the transformed element w from y. Session types allow us to formalize these protocols spec-
ifying the type, direction and order of messages exchanged within sessions. In this case, the session
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Figure 1: Stream processing networks with first-order (left) and second-order (right) sessions.
endpoints x and y owned by User are typed as x : ?int.?int.end and y : !int.!int.?int.end.
In words, User uses x to receive two integer numbers and y to send two numbers and then to re-
ceive another one. What session types do not describe are additional requirements and guarantees
concerning the content of exchanged messages. In this scenario, for example, it could be sensible
to specify that the second number sent from User to Operator should be different from zero and
that the number sent from Operator to User is non negative. Such specifications – hereafter called
contracts – could be used to monitor, at runtime, the interaction between User and Operator so
as to detect contract violations and, hopefully, to guide programmers to the source of the problem.
The approach of Findler and Felleisen [2002] to contract monitoring rests on three key ingre-
dients: (1) a set of combinators for writing contracts; (2) a mechanism for associating contracts
with the entities being monitored; (3) a labeling of the modules involved that narrows the source
of the problem in case a contract violation is detected. In our setting, the definition
let operator_chan = register operator_body operator_c "Operator"
registers a new service channel operator_chan that can be used to initiate sessions with Operator.
Registration links together three pieces of information: the body of the process that handles each
session initiated with Operator (operator_body, omitted here), the contract that Operator claims
to satisfy (operator_c), and a symbolic label that identifies Operator (the string "Operator").
The contract operator_c is defined as
let operator_c =
send_c any_c @@ send_c (flat_c (6= 0)) @@ receive_c (flat_c (≥ 0)) @@ end_c
and its structure reflects that of the protocol !int.!int.?int.end of the session it describes. Let
us focus first on the four sub-contracts separated by @@ and built with the send_c, receive_c, and
end_c combinators. As their name suggest, each of these indicates either an output or an input
or the termination of the session. Both send_c and receive_c have an argument which is itself
a contract describing the exchanged message: depending on whether the operation is an input or
an output, the contract specifies a requirement or a guarantee for the message. So, the contract
flat_c ( 6= 0) is satisfied by any non-zero integer, flat_c (≥ 0) is satisfied by any non-negative
integer, and any_c is satisfied by any value. Note that the contract is written from the viewpoint
of a client of Operator, such as User. The combinator @@ plays the same role as the dot ‘.’ in
session types and composes contracts sequentially: it indicates that the contract associated with
the endpoint, and the specified constraints on the exchanged messages, vary after each interaction:
Operator first accepts an arbitrary integer number, it then expects a non-zero number from the
client, and it finally sends back a non-negative number. As it turns out, @@ is nothing but function
application. Therefore, operator_c can be alternatively defined as
send_c any_c (send_c (flat_c (6= 0)) (receive_c (flat_c (≥ 0)) end_c))
We will keep using @@ in this section for the sake of readability. In the rest of the paper we
will drop @@ and use parentheses to disambiguate the structure of contracts when necessary.
The definitions
let source_c = receive_c any_c @@ receive_c any_c @@ end_c
let source_chan = register source_body source_c "Source"
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register a service channel for Source in an analogous way. In this case, source_c does not specify
any additional constraints with respect to the session type ?int.?int.end. With Source and
Operator in place, we are ready to implement User:
1 let user () =
2 let x = connect source_chan "User" in (* connect with Source *)
3 let y = connect operator_chan "User" in (* connect with Operator *)
4 let v1, x = receive x in (* receive v1 from Source *)
5 let v2, x = receive x in (* receive v2 from Source *)
6 let y = send v1 y in (* send v1 to Operator *)
7 let y = send v2 y in (* send v2 to Operator *)
8 let w, y = receive y in (* receive result *)
9 print_int w; close x; close y (* close sessions *)
After initiating the two sessions x and y (lines 2–3), User implements the behavior informally
described above making use of the operations send and receive for session communications. The
series of rebindings of the session endpoints x and y is a common trait of most implementations of
sessions for functional languages and allows for the type of x and y to be appropriately updated
after each operation. The connect primitive specifies the shared channel on which the sessions are
initiated and a label that identifies the requesting party. This label, together with those specified
at the time of service registration, is used by the runtime monitoring mechanism to pinpoint the
source of a contract violation. Here, "User" identifies the module responsible for the messages sent
on x and y, whereas "Source" and "Operator", associated with source_chan and operator_chan
at the time of their registration, identify the modules that are responsible for the messages received
from x and y, respectively. So if v2 turns out to be 0, the runtime monitoring of the y session
endpoint flags User for breaching the contract with Operator. If, on the other hand, Operator
sends a negative remainder back to User, then it is Operator that violates its own contract.
In this first example, the module responsible for a contract violation is easily identified with
the sender of the message that triggers the violation. This is not always the case, though. Con-
sider for instance the network on the right-hand side of Figure 1, which aims to achieve the same
computation as before, except that User now delegates the session endpoint x to Operator so that
Operator receives the elements v1, v2 directly from Source, rather than having them forwarded
through User. In this case, the session type associated with y is !(?int.?int.end).?int.end,
indicating that User first sends Operator a session endpoint of type ?int.?int.end (that is pre-
cisely the type of x) and then behaves according to ?int.end to receive the result from Operator.
Correspondingly, the contract exposed by Operator could be the following
let operator_deleg_c =
send_c (receive_c any_c @@ receive_c (flat_c (6= 0)) @@ end_c) @@
receive_c (flat_c (≥ 0)) @@ end_c
specifying that the first message received by Operator is a session endpoint from which the second
receive element is supposed to be different from zero. That is, operator_deleg_c is a second-order
contract for a second-order session.
The implementation of User becomes
1 let user_deleg () =
2 let x = connect source_chan "User" in
3 let y = connect operator_deleg_chan "User" in
4 let y = send x y in
5 let res, y = receive y in
6 print_int res; close y
which establishes the two sessions as before (lines 2–3), delegates x on y (line 4), and then receives
the result from Operator (line 5) before closing the session (line 6). As before, the arrival of a
zero v2 element to Operator should trigger a contract violation, but establishing which process is
to blame is not as easy as in the previous example. On the one hand, the offending element is sent
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Table 1: Syntax of λCoS (terms that occur only at runtime and not in user code are shaded ).
Process P,Q ::= 〈e〉p | a⇐cp v | P ‖Q | (νa)P
Expression e ::= v | x | e1e2 | let x,y = e1 in e2 | case e of e1 | e2
| [e1]e2,p,q | v /p e | blame p
Value v, w,c,d ::= λx.e | ε
| c v1 · · · vn (0 ≤ n ≤ #c)
Endpoint ε ::= aι | [ε]c,p,q
Constant c ::= () | true | false | inl | inr | pair | dual
| connect | close | send | receive | branch | left | right
| flat_c | end_c | branch_c | choice_c
| send_c | send_d | receive_c | receive_d
by Source so, if we were to follow the simple rule for blame assignment used before, we would
conclude that Source is to blame. On the other hand, Source has never violated the source_c
contract it was registered with. The problem lies once again within User: by delegating x on y,
User is claiming that the contract source_c associated with x entails the contract
receive_c any_c @@ receive_c (flat_c (6= 0)) @@ end_c
but this is not true, because not every message satisfying any_c also satisfies flat_c (6= 0). In
summary, the actual offending operation is the delegation performed by User, but establishing this
fact would require a decision procedure for contract entailment, which is instead an undecidable
relation (contracts may contain arbitrarily complex predicates expressed using a Turing complete
language). Therefore, the delegation is provisionally accepted as valid and triggers a suitable
rearrangement of contracts and labels for the involved endpoints such that, in the event of a
contract violation, User and not Source is blamed.
In the rest of the paper we extend and formalize the ideas sketched in this section. In particular,
we will consider a superset of the contract combinators used in this section that allow us to specify
dependent, possibly branching contracts whose structure depends on the content of previously
exchanged messages. The formalization will culminate with a blame soundness result stating that
a process cannot be blamed by the monitor if it always respects the contracts of the endpoints it
uses.
3 Syntax and Semantics of λCoS
3.1 Syntax
We use infinite sets of variables x, y, z and service/session channels a, b, c. We use polarities
ι ∈ {+, -} to distinguish the two endpoints of a session channel and write ι for the dual polarity
of ι, where + = - and - = +. An endpoint is a pair aι made of a session channel a and a polarity
ι and we say that aι is the peer of aι. A name u is either a variable or a channel or an endpoint.
The syntax of λCoS comprises processes and expressions (Table 1). Expressions model the
sequential part of programs and processes model parallel threads that invoke services and commu-
nicate through sessions. A process is either a thread 〈e〉p made of a body e and a label p, a service
a⇐cp v that waits for invocations on the service channel a and spawns new threads with body v,
the parallel composition P ‖Q of two processes P and Q, or a session (νa)P with scope P . Each
service advertises a contract c that describes the intended interaction from the client’s viewpoint.
For simplicity, we assume that services cannot be created dynamically in λCoS. As we have seen
in Section 2, the implementation is more liberal and allows new services to be dynamically created
and registered. A module is a set of threads and services with the same label. We use labels p, q
to identify modules and to assign blame.
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Expressions include the standard constructs of the λ-calculus, pair splitting let x,y = e1 in e2,
and pattern matching case e of e1 | e2. Additionally, we have three constructs that support run-
time monitoring Findler and Felleisen [2002], Wadler and Findler [2009]. A monitored expression
[e1]
e2,p,q wraps e1 with a contract e2 and the labels p and q identify the modules responsible for
the values respectively flowing out of and into e1. Such modules may be blamed if the flowing val-
ues do not satisfy the constraints specified by the contract e2. In λCoS, the intuition behind these
flows of values is best illustrated by thinking of e1 as a session endpoint. Then, p is the module
responsible for the messages received from the endpoint, whereas q is the module responsible for
the messages sent on the endpoint. Sometimes we use σ and % to denote pairs of labels such as p, q,
and we write ¬σ for the symmetric pair obtained by swapping the components in σ. We say that
p is the positive label and q the negative label in the pair p, q. Monitors may accumulate on top of
each other yielding stacks of the form [ · · · [e]c1,σ1 · · · ]cn,σn that we abbreviate as [e]c,σ . Values
flowing out of e are checked against all the contracts c1, . . . ,cn starting from c1, whereas values
flowing into e are checked against all the contracts cn, . . . ,c1 starting from cn. It is sometimes
necessary to reverse the order of monitors while swapping the elements of the pairs σi. In these
cases we write [e]c,¬σ for [ · · · [e]cn,¬σn · · · ]c1,¬σ1 . A busy monitor v /p e indicates an ongoing
check being performed on value v. If e evaluates to true then the check is passed and the busy
monitor reduces to v. If e evaluates to false then the busy monitor reduces to blame p signaling a
contract violation of p. So, a busy monitor v/p e is akin to a conditional if e then v else blame p.
We use v, w, c and d to range over values, which comprise abstractions, (monitored) end-
points, and (applied) constants. We reserve c and d for values that represent contracts, which
are described below. Constants comprise some standard data constructors (unit, booleans, pairs,
sums) and a standard set of session primitives for connecting to services (connect), sending and
receiving messages (send and receive), selecting a choice (left and right) and offering a choice
(branch).
Constants of the form ∗_c and ∗_d are contract constructors. A flat contract flat_c w is
satisfied by every value v such that wv evaluates to true. We say that w is the predicate of the
contract flat_c w.
The contract end_c describes an endpoint that can only be closed. The non-dependent contracts
send_c c d and receive_c c d (sugared as !c;d and ?c;d) have a prefix c and a continuation d
and describe endpoints used for respectively sending and receiving a message that satisfies c and
then used according to d. These contracts are qualified as “non dependent” because the continua-
tion contract d does not depend on the exchanged message. The dependent contracts send_d c w
and receive_d c w (sugared as !c.w and ?c.w) describe endpoints used for respectively send-
ing and receiving a message v that satisfies c and then used according to wv. That is, w is a
function that produces the continuation contract when applied to the exchanged message. In prin-
ciple, a non-dependent contract such as !c;d could be treated as a degenerate dependent contract
!c.λ_.d, where the function that computes the continuation contract is constant. However, the
two contract forms require different typing policies and therefore must be kept distinct, at least in
the formal model. In the implementation, which is based on a weaker type system, the two forms
can be unified so that non-dependent contracts are indeed degenerate cases of dependent ones.
The contracts choice_c c d e and branch_c c d e (sugared as !c.d:e and ?c.d:e) describe
endpoints used for respectively selecting and offering a choice. The choice is effectively represented
and transmitted as a boolean value v that satisfies c. The continuation contracts d and e describe
the endpoint after the choice, depending on whether v is true or false. Compared to dependent
contracts, choices also allow the session types of the continuations, and not just the contracts, to
depend on the exchanged message. There is a key difference between flat and session contracts.
Flat contracts are meant to be checked right away, turning a monitor into a busy monitor. Session
contracts chaperone the endpoints they wrap and are checked only if and when the endpoints are
used for input/output operations. Also, session contracts are dynamically updated as the endpoint
they wrap is used.
The primitive dual computes the dual of a contract c, which specifies the same constraints as
c except for the direction of messages, which is reversed. We will see how it is used later on.
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Table 2: Reduction of expressions (contextual rule omitted).
[R1] (λx.e)v → e{v/x}
[R2] let x,y = (v,w) in e → e{v, w/x, y}
[R3] case inl v of e1 | e2 → e1v
[R4] case inr v of e1 | e2 → e2v
[R5] [v]flat_c w,p,q → v /p wv
[R6] v /p true → v
[R7] v /p false → blame p
[R8] dual end_c → end_c
[R9] dual !c;d → ?c;dual d
[R10] dual ?c;d → !c;dual d
[R11] dual !c.w → ?c.λx.dual (wx)
[R12] dual ?c.w → !c.λx.dual (wx)
[R13] dual !c.d:e → ?c.dual d:dual e
[R14] dual ?c.d:e → !c.dual d:dual e
An applied constant c v1 · · · vn is a value only if 0 ≤ n ≤ #c where #c denotes the arity of c,
that is the maximum number of arguments to which c can be applied before possibly becoming
a redex. In λCoS, branch_c and choice_c have arity 3, pair, send_c, receive_c, send_d and
receive_d have arity 2, inl, inr, send and flat_c have arity 1, and all the other constants have
arity 0.
We identify processes and expressions modulo α-renaming of bound names, considering that
(νa)P binds a, a+, and a- in P , and we assume that bound names are all distinct. We say that P
is a user process if it does not use any runtime syntax as by Table 1.
3.2 Semantics
Expressions reduce according to a call-by-value strategy, for which we define evaluation contexts
thus:
E ::= [ ] | E e | vE | [E ]e,σ | [v]E ,σ | v /p E | let x,y = E in e | case E of e1 | e2
The reduction rules for expressions are given in Table 2. Rules [R1–R4] are standard. According
to rule [R5], a monitor with a flat contract flat_c w wrapping a value v turns into a busy monitor
that checks whether v satisfies the contract by evaluating wv. When the evaluation of wv termi-
nates, the busy monitor reduces to v if the check succeeds (see rule [R6]) or blames p otherwise
(see rule [R7]). Note that [R5] duplicates v in the reduct. Since endpoints are linear resources, the
definition of flat contracts on endpoints (and on linear resources in general) will be forbidden by
the type system.
Rules [R8–R14] compute the dual of a contract by reversing the orientation of interactions. For
instance, given the contract c
def
= !(flat_c (≥ 0));?(flat_c (≤ 3));end_c we have
dual c→→→ ?(flat_c (≥ 0));!(flat_c (≤ 3));end_c
Processes reduce according to the rules in Table 3, where we stack parallel threads instead of
separating them by ‖ whenever there is not enough space. Rule [R15] models the initiation of a
session through the service channel a. In the reduct, the endpoint b+ of the new session is returned
to the client and the endpoint b- is passed to the body v of the service in a new thread. The
endpoints b+ and b- are respectively monitored by the contracts c and dual c. The labels in the
two monitors reflect the direction of the messages exchanged over the endpoints: in the client, p
is negative since p is responsible for the messages sent to the service and q is positive since q is
responsible for the messages received by the client; in the spawned thread the responsibilities are
reversed. Rule [R16] models the closing of a session.
Rule [R17] models a communication from thread p to thread q on session a, when the endpoints
of a are monitored by non-dependent contracts. The rule appears more complicated than it really
is. If we erase all the monitors, the rule boils down to
〈E [send v aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive aι]〉q → 〈E [aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[(v,aι)]〉q
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Table 3: Reduction of processes (contextual rules omitted).
[R15]
〈E [connect a]〉p
a⇐cq v
 → (νb)〈E [[b+]c,q,p]〉p〈v [b-]dual c,p,q〉q
 ‖ a⇐cq v b fresh
[R16] (νa)
〈E [close [a+]end_c,σ ]〉p〈E ′[close [a-]end_c,%]〉q
 → 〈E [()]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[()]〉q
[R17]
〈E [send v [aι]!c;d,σ ]〉p〈E ′[receive [aι]?e;f,%]〉q
 →
〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q

[R18]
〈E [send v [aι]!c.w1,σ ]〉p〈E ′[receive [aι]?d.w2,%]〉q
 →
〈E [[aι]w1v,σ ]〉p〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]d,%,[aι]w2v,%)]〉q

[R19]
〈E [left [aι]!c.d:e,σ ]〉p〈E ′[branch [aι]?f.g:h,%]〉q
 →
〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p〈E ′[(λ_.inl [aι]g,%) [[true]c,¬σ]f,%]〉q

[R20]
〈E [right [aι]!c.d:e,σ ]〉p〈E ′[branch [aι]?f.g:h,%]〉q
 →
〈E [[aι]e,σ ]〉p〈E ′[(λ_.inr [aι]h,%) [[false]c,¬σ]f,%]〉q

where we see that the message v just moves from the sender to the receiver. All the additional
machinery in [R17] handles contracts. In particular, aι in the sender is monitored by a contract
of the form !ci;di and a
ι in the receiver is monitored by a contract of the form ?ej;fj . In the
reduct, these contracts must be updated to di and fj to reflect the fact that the communication has
occurred. Also, the message v is wrapped by all the contracts ci and ej it is meant to satisfy. Since
v is flowing into aι, the contracts ci are stacked inside out so that the checks on v are performed
in the right order. Also, the blame labels are swapped to reflect the correct responsibilities in case
contract violations are detected.
Rule [R18] is similar to [R17], except that the two endpoints before the communication are mon-
itored by dependent contracts !ci.w1i and ?dj.w2j and the continuation contracts are obtained
by applying w1i and w2j to the message. Note that v occurs several times in the reduct. As
we have discussed for [R5], this could be problematic if v contains linear values such as session
endpoints. Hence, the typing of send_d and receive_d will prevent the definition of contracts
that depend on linear values. For simplicity, rules [R17] and [R18] are formulated in such a way
that communications occur only when the contracts in the monitors stacked around the involved
endpoints are all dependent or all non dependent. This restriction has been introduced solely to
avoid considering all the possible combinations of dependent and non-dependent contracts and is
relaxed in the implementation, where such distinction is blurred (Section 6.1).
Rules [R19] and [R20] model communications whereby both the session type and the contract
of the endpoints in the reduct (may) depend upon the exchanged message, which is implicitly
assumed to be true in [R19] and false in [R20]. As in [R17] and [R18] the message is checked against
a suitable stack of contracts. Then, the receiver injects the continuation endpoint using either inl
or inr correspondingly. Observe that not all of the contracts appearing in the redex also appear
in the reduct. In prospect of devising a substructural typing discipline for λCoS, this suggests that
contracts should not contain linear resources such as session endpoints.
We stress two facts concerning the reduction rules [R17–R20]. First, we observe that the whole
stacks of monitors wrapping the endpoints on which the communication takes place are rearranged
in a single reduction step. This is what we mean by “big-step” monitoring semantics, as opposed
to the “small-step” monitoring semantics where each monitor is rearranged independently of the
others Findler and Felleisen [2002], Wadler and Findler [2009]. The big-step semantics allows us
to rely on some key properties of monitor configurations (Proposition 1) when proving the blame
soundness results (Section 5). Second, we observe that part of the contracts on the sender side
migrate to the receiving side after the communication. For delegations – that is the communication
of session endpoints – the migration results in the delegated endpoint being wrapped by further
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chaperone contracts in addition to those it already has. This is necessary to keep track of the
responsibilities of the sender even after the communication has occurred (Example 2). For other
messages not containing endpoints the migration essentially means that message contracts are
always checked on the receiver side, after the communication has occurred. In the implementation
(Section 6) we consider the alternative “small-step” monitoring semantics where flat contracts for
messages are checked on the sender side, before communication takes place.
We omit the obvious rules that lift reduction of expression to processes and that close reductions
by (process) contexts and structural congruence. The details can be found in Appendix A. In the
following we write →∗ for the reflexive, transitive closure of the → relations for expressions and
processes. We also introduce some convenient notation for the evaluation of expressions and
predicates:
Definition 1 (evaluation). We write e ⇓ v if e→∗ v and we write v ∈ w if wv ⇓ true.
Example 1 (function contracts). In this example we show an encoding of function contracts in
the style of Findler and Felleisen [2002] as session contracts. Suppose that f is a function and
c 7→ d its contract, where c and d are respectively the contracts for the domain and codomain of
f . We may represent the function f as a service and the contract c 7→ d as the session contract
!c;?d;end_c, thus:
af ⇐!c;?d;end_cp λx.let y,x = receive x in let x = send (f y) x in close x
The contract !c;?d;end_c gives a natural description of the intended usage protocol for f :
the client must send f an argument that satisfies c and will receive back from f a value that
satisfies d. Accordingly, an application (f v) can be modeled as follows:
let x = connect af in let x = send v x in let y,x = receive x in close x; · · · y · · ·
Thanks to delegations, the encoding shown here accounts also for higher-order functions and
its generalization to dependent functions is straightforward. However, the encoding is purely
conceptual and not meant to suggest a practical implementation. Its purpose is to show that
the blame soundness results presented in Section 5 are comprehensive enough to also account
for the functional part of the calculus, which we have deliberately neglected to keep the formal
development as simple and focused on sessions as possible. 
4 Type System
We define a session type system for λCoS loosely inspired to that of Gay and Vasconcelos [2010].
Following Tov and Pucella [2011], we use kinds to distinguish unlimited types, those denoting
values that can be discarded and duplicated, from linear types, those denoting values (such as
endpoints) that must be used exactly once. The syntax of kinds, types, and session types is given
below:
Kind κ ::= 1 | ω
Type t, s ::= unit | t× s | t+ s | t→κ s | [t] | #T | T
Session Type T, S ::= end | ?t.T | !t.T | T & S | T ⊕ S
Types, ranged over by t, s, include base types and standard type constructors. Arrows →κ
have a kind annotation κ that indicates whether a function can be applied an arbitrary number of
times (κ = ω) or must be applied exactly once (κ = 1). This latter constraint is necessary if the
function contains one or more linear values in its closure. We will abbreviate →ω with →. The
contract type [t] describes contracts for values of type t and the shared channel type #T describes
channels for initiating sessions with session type T . Session types have the standard constructors
for denoting depleted session endpoints (end), input/output operations (?t.T and !t.T ), branches
(T & S) and choices (T ⊕ S).
We now define a relation that assigns kinds to each type. Every type t has kind 1, since using
a value of type t exactly once is always safe regardless of t. By contrast, only those types denoting
values that can be safely duplicated or discarded have kind ω. Formally:
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Table 4: Type schemes of λCoS constants.
() : unit
true : bool
false : bool
inl : t→ t+ s
inr : s→ t+ s
connect : #T → T
close : end→ unit
left : T ⊕ S → T
right : T ⊕ S → S
branch : T & S → T + S
dual : [T]→ [T]
pair : t→ s→κ t× s t :: κ
send : t→ !t.T →κ T t :: κ
receive : ?t.T → t× T
flat_c : (t→ bool)→ [t] t :: ω
end_c : [end]
send_c : [t]→ [T]→ [!t.T]
receive_c : [t]→ [T]→ [?t.T]
send_d : [t]→ (t→ [T])→ [!t.T] t :: ω
receive_d : [t]→ (t→ [T])→ [?t.T] t :: ω
choice_c : [bool]→ [T]→ [S]→ [T ⊕ S]
branch_c : [bool]→ [T]→ [S]→ [T & S]
Definition 2 (kinding). We say that t has kind κ if t :: κ is derivable by:
unit :: ω [t] :: ω #T :: ω t→κ s :: κ t :: κ s :: κ
t s :: κ  ∈ {×,+}
t :: ω
t :: 1
Note that contract types and shared channel types have kind ω, whereas the kind of a sum
or product depends on that of its components. In particular, a sum/product has kind ω only if
both its components do as well. We say that t is unlimited if t :: ω and that t is linear otherwise,
namely if t :: κ implies κ = 1. For example, ?int.end and int→1 bool and int + ?int.end are
all linear, but ?int.end→ bool is not.
We introduce type environments to keep track of the type of free names in expressions and
processes. A type environment Γ is a finite map from names to types written u1 : t1, . . . , un : tn.
We write ∅ for the empty type environment, dom(Γ) for the domain of Γ , namely the set of names for
which there is an association in Γ , and Γ , Γ ′ for the union of Γ and Γ ′ when dom(Γ)∩ dom(Γ ′) = ∅.
We extend the notion of kinding to type environments and write Γ :: κ if Γ(u) :: κ for every
u ∈ dom(Γ).
As usual, we need a way of splitting and combining type environments that is more flexible than
disjoint union and, at the same time, prevents the duplication of linear resources. We therefore
define a (partial) combination operator + analogous to the one given by Kobayashi et al. [1999]:
Definition 3 (environment combination). We write + for the partial operation on type environ-
ments such that:
Γ + Γ ′ def= Γ , Γ ′ if dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ ′) = ∅
(Γ , u : t) + (Γ ′, u : t) def= (Γ + Γ ′), u : t if t :: ω
Note that Γ+Γ ′ is undefined if there are associations u : t ∈ Γ and u : t′ ∈ Γ ′ for the same name
u such that either t and t′ are different or at least one of them is linear. This prevents multiple
uses of a linear resource. Note also that Γ + Γ is always defined and equal to Γ itself when Γ :: ω.
To ensure communication safety, threads are required to perform complementary actions on
the peer endpoints of the same session. This is enforced by assigning dual session types to peer
endpoints. Roughly, the dual of a session type is obtained by swapping inputs with outputs and
choices with branches. Formally:
Definition 4 (session type duality). The dual of T is the session type T defined as:
end = end ?t.T = !t.T !t.T = ?t.T T & S = T ⊕ S T ⊕ S = T & S
Note that duality is an involution, that is T = T .
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Table 5: Typing rules.
Typing rules for expressions Γ ` e : t
[t-const]
Γ :: ω c : t
Γ ` c : t
[t-name]
Γ :: ω
Γ , u : t ` u : t
[t-blame]
Γ ` blame p : t
[t-busy-monitor]
Γ1 ` e : bool Γ2 ` v : t
Γ1 + Γ2 ` v /p e : t
[t-fun]
Γ , x : t ` e : s Γ :: κ
Γ ` λx.e : t→κ s
[t-app]
Γ1 ` e1 : t→κ s Γ2 ` e2 : t
Γ1 + Γ2 ` e1e2 : s
[t-monitor]
Γ1 ` e1 : t Γ2 ` e2 : [t]
Γ1 + Γ2 ` [e1]e2,p,q : t
[t-split]
Γ1 ` e1 : t1 × t2 Γ2, x : t1, y : t2 ` e2 : t
Γ1 + Γ2 ` let x,y = e1 in e2 : t
[t-case]
Γ1 ` e : t1 + t2 Γ2 ` ei : ti →κi t (i=1,2)
Γ1 + Γ2 ` case e of e1 | e2 : t
Typing rules for processes Γ ` P
[t-thread]
Γ ` e : unit
Γ ` 〈e〉p
[t-par]
Γi ` Pi (i=1,2)
Γ1 + Γ2 ` P1 ‖ P2
[t-session]
Γ , a+ : T, a- : T ` P
Γ ` (νa)P
[t-service]
∅ ` c : [T] Γ ` v : T → unit
Γ + a : #T ` a⇐cp v
Table 4 shows the type schemes of λCoS constants as associations of the form c : t. In general,
each constant may have infinitely many types. The types of data constructors are standard, the
only quirk being the second arrow in the type of pair which has the same kind as the first element
of the pair. This accounts for the possibility that such element has a linear type, in which case
exactly one pair must be created to avoid duplicating the element. For example, the partial
application pair aι is a function which must be applied exactly once in order to preserve the
linearity of aι. The types of the communication primitives are essentially those given by Gay and
Vasconcelos [2010] and the types of the contract constructors follow from their semantics. Note
that flat_c and the dependent contracts receive_d and send_d require the tested value/message
to have an unlimited type, since it may be duplicated.
The typing rules for λCoS (Table 5) are fairly standard, so we only comment on a few notable
features. In rules [t-const] and [t-name] the condition Γ :: ω makes sure that the unused part of type
environments does not contain linear resources. Rule [t-fun] requires the arrow type of a function
to have the same kind as the environment in which the function is typed. If there is a linear type
in the environment, meaning that the function has a linear value in its closure, then the function
can only be applied once. Rule [t-app] makes use of the + operator for type environments to keep
track of the usage of linear resources occurring in the function and its argument. Rules [t-split]
and [t-case] are standard. Note once again the use of + for combining type environments. A
monitored expression [e1]
e2,p,q is well typed provided that e2 is a contract for values of the same
type as that of e1. A busy monitor is well typed provided that the condition being checked has
type bool. Rule [t-blame] states that a blame has any type and is always well typed regardless of
the environment. We do not treat blame recovery in the formal model.
Concerning processes, [t-thread] and [t-par] are as expected. Rule [t-session] introduces a session
as a pair of peer endpoints with dual session types. Finally, [t-service] requires a well-typed service
to advertise a contract of the appropriate type and to have a body that accepts one endpoint
at each invocation. The body must be unlimited to allow for an arbitrary number of session
initiations.
We state subject reduction as a basic sanity check for the type system. Other standard prop-
erties – e.g. communication safety and session fidelity – also hold, but are irrelevant in this paper.
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Theorem 1. If Γ :: ω and Γ ` P and P → Q, then Γ ` Q.
A suitable generalization of Theorem 1, where Γ is allowed to contain linear names, is given in
Appendix B.
5 Blame Soundness
In this section we present the soundness of the monitoring mechanism in λCoS, namely the property
that in a well-typed program P in which a module p “behaves well”, p cannot be blamed. We
proceed according to the following roadmap. First, we introduce the notion of contract entailment
to specify when a contract is “more demanding than” another (Section 5.1). Entailment is a
natural generalization of subtyping of session types Gay and Hole [2005]. Using entailment, we
formalize the notion of locally correct module p as a module that always honors the contracts of
the endpoints it uses. Locality refers to the fact that the correctness of p solely depends on the
actions performed by, and on information known to, the module p itself (Section 5.2). Finally, we
characterize the soundness of a module p as a set of invariant properties of the (busy) monitors in
which the label p occurs. A direct consequence of soundness is that a well-typed, locally correct
module p cannot be blamed (Section 5.3).
5.1 Contract Entailment
Contract entailment is a relation 6 such that, when c 6 d holds, each value that satisfies c can be
used where a value that satisfies d is expected. When c and d are flat contracts, 6 boils down to
the set-theoretic inclusion between the values that satisfy the respective predicates. For example,
flat_c (≥ 3) 6 flat_c (≥ 0)
since every number greater than or equal to 3 is also greater than or equal to 0. To define entailment
when c and d are session contracts, it helps to recall the analogy of contracts as specifications for
the messages that can be sent on and received from a session endpoint. In this case, c 6 d holds
if two conditions are satisfied:
1. Every message that can be received from an endpoint satisfying c can also be received from
an endpoint satisfying d.
2. Every message that can be sent on an endpoint satisfying d can also be sent on an endpoint
satisfying c.
Note that c and d occur in different orders according to the direction of exchanged messages.
With these intuitions, we formalize entailment below:
Definition 5 (contract entailment). We say that e1 entails e2, written e1 6 e2, if one of following
conditions holds:
1. e1 ⇓ flat_c w1 and e2 ⇓ flat_c w2 and v ∈ w1 implies v ∈ w2;
2. e1 ⇓ end_c and e2 ⇓ end_c;
3. e1 ⇓ !c1;d1 and e2 ⇓ !c2;d2 and c2 6 c1 and d1 6 d2;
4. e1 ⇓ ?c1;d1 and e2 ⇓ ?c2;d2 and c1 6 c2 and d1 6 d2;
5. e1 ⇓ !flat_c v1.w1 and e2 ⇓ !flat_c v2.w2 and v ∈ v2 implies v ∈ v1 and w1v 6 w2v;
6. e1 ⇓ ?flat_c v1.w1 and e2 ⇓ ?flat_c v2.w2 and v ∈ v1 implies v ∈ v2 and w1v 6 w2v;
7. e1 ⇓ !c1.d1:e1 and e2 ⇓ !c2.d2:e2 and c2 6 c1 and d1 6 d2 and e1 6 e2;
8. e1 ⇓ ?c1.d1:e1 and e2 ⇓ ?c2.d2:e2 and c1 6 c2 and d1 6 d2 and e1 6 e2.
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Condition 1 formalizes the set-theoretic inclusion relation between sets of values that satisfy
given predicates, whereas condition 2 relates the contract end_c with itself. Conditions 3–4 deal
with non-dependent contracts. Entailment is covariant on input prefixes, contravariant on output
prefixes, and always covariant on continuation contracts. For example, we have
!flat_c (≥ 0);end_c 6 !flat_c (≥ 3);end_c
because the contract on the left-hand side imposes weaker requirements on the messages that can
be sent on the endpoint. On the other hand we have
?flat_c (≥ 3);end_c 6 ?flat_c (≥ 0);end_c
for the contract on the left-hand side provides stronger guarantees on the messages that can be
received from the endpoint.
Conditions 5–6 deal with dependent contracts. The prefix contracts must be flat, since these
are the only contracts that can specify constraints on unlimited values. Dependent contracts
essentially behave as non-dependent ones, with contravariant outputs and covariant inputs, except
that the continuation contracts may depend upon the exchanged message v. For example, we have
!flat_c (≥ 0).λx.?flat_c (≤ x);end_c 6 !flat_c (≥ 3).λ_.?flat_c λ_.true;end_c
where hereafter we write _ for irrelevant names and sub-terms.
Conditions 7–8 deal with choices and branches. Recalling that a choice is akin to an out-
put and a branch is akin to an input, the definition of entailment essentially follows the same
contravariant/covariant pattern we have already seen in the other cases.
Overall, contract entailment is analogous to the subtyping relation for session types Gay and
Hole [2005]. This analogy provides us with the same substitution principle that drives subtyping:
when c 6 d, it is safe to use an endpoint with contract c wherever an endpoint with contract d is
expected. We will make use of this analogy when defining locally correct modules (Definition 6).
There are two traits of entailment that set it apart from subtyping. The first one is that entailment
is a relation between terms and therefore is undecidable in general. In our setting this is not an
issue because the decision as to whether one contract entails another one is not meant to be
computed, but is left to the programmer (Section 5.2). The second difference is that entailment is
not reflexive in general: according to Definition 5, it must be possible to evaluate contracts solely
using the reduction relation for expressions, whereas it is possible to write (well-typed) contracts
that make use of communication primitives and that reduce only when they occur within a suitable
process. In this sense, by embracing Definition 5 we take the viewpoint that contracts should be
pure Meyer [1992] and their evaluation should not involve side effects. This condition cannot be
enforced solely by our type system. From now on, we will make the assumption that c 6 c holds
whenever c is advertised by a service a⇐cp v. It is easy to see that entailment is transitive.
5.2 Locally Correct Modules
A locally correct module honors the contracts of all the endpoints it uses. Since contracts may
depend upon the messages exchanged on such endpoints, we resort to an operational definition of
correctness that takes into account all the possible reductions of a process in which label p occurs.
The “local” qualification is meant to stress the fact that correctness of a module p only depends
on actions performed by, and information known to, the module p itself.
To identify the actions performed by a module p, we introduce p-contexts Pp as terms generated
by the grammar
Pp ::= 〈E 〉p | (Pp ‖ P ) | (P ‖Pp) | (νa)Pp
where E is a plain evaluation context. As usual, we write Pp[e] for the process obtained by filling
the hole in Pp with e. Locally correct modules are defined below.
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Definition 6 (local correctness). Let C be the largest relation between blame labels and processes
such that p C P implies:
1. P =Pp[send v [_]
!flat_c w;_,_,_] implies v ∈ w, and
2. P =Pp[send v [_]
!flat_c w._,_,_] implies v ∈ w, and
3. P =Pp[send [_]
c,_,_ [_]!d;_,_,_] implies c 6 d, and
4. P =Pp[left [_]
!flat_c w._:_,_,_] implies true ∈ w, and
5. P =Pp[right [_]
!flat_c w._:_,_,_] implies false ∈ w, and
6. P → Q implies p C Q.
We say that module p is (locally) correct in P if p C P holds.
Condition 1 requires a message v sent over an endpoint monitored by a non-dependent contract
!flat_c w;_ to satisfy the predicate w. Condition 2 is similar, except that the contract is a
dependent one. Condition 3 concerns delegations whereby an endpoint with contract c is sent as
a message that is supposed to satisfy contract d. According to the substitution principle, this is
safe if c entails d. Conditions 4–5 concern choices. In these cases, the selected label (either true
or false) is required to satisfy the predicate specified by the choice contract. Finally, condition 6
requires the previous conditions to hold for every possible reduction of P .
Example 2. To illustrate the notion of locally correct module, consider the services
a ⇐cq λx1.let y1 = connect b in let x2 = send y1 x1 in close x2
b ⇐dr λy1.let z,y2 = receive y1 in print z−1;close y2
with labels q and r and the contracts
c
def
= ?e;end_c
c
def
= !e;end_c
d
def
= !f;end_c
d
def
= ?f;end_c
e
def
= !any_c;end_c f
def
= flat_c ( 6= 0)
noting that c and d are the contracts advertised by q and r, respectively. Also note that dual c ⇓ c
and dual d ⇓ d. Service r receives a non-zero number z and prints its inverse. Service q initiates
a session with r and then delegates the corresponding endpoint y1 to its client. Consider also the
p-labeled client
〈let x1 = connect a in
let y1,x2 = receive x1 in
let y2 = send 0 y1 in close x2;close y2〉p
which connects to service q, receives a session endpoint y1 from it, and then sends 0 on y1. Observe
that p connects to a service whose contract is ?(!any_c;end_c);end_c. Hence, p believes that
the contract of y1 is !any_c;end_c and that it is allowed to send 0 on y1.
Working out the reductions of the client in parallel with the two services we obtain the following
assignments for the variables occurring in modules p, q, and r:
p

x1 = [c
+]c,q,p
y1 = [[[d
+]d,r,q]e,q,p]e,q,p
x2 = [c
+]end_c,q,p
y2 = [[[d
+]end_c,r,q]end_c,q,p]end_c,q,p
q
x1 = [c-]c,p,qy1 = [d+]d,r,q
x2 = [c
-]end_c,p,q
r
y1 = [d-]d,q,rz ≈ [[[[0]any_c,p,q]any_c,p,q]f,q,r]f,q,r
y2 ≈ [d-]end_c,q,r
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An assignment x = v denotes the fact that the program reduces to a state in which the
substitution {v/x} is actually performed in the respective thread. The assignment z ≈ e in thread
r does not materialize into an actual substitution because 0 does not satisfy f and the evaluation
of e eventually blames q. A similar observation holds for y2.
According to Definition 6, in order to identify the locally correct modules we have to consider
all the output operations performed by these threads. We deduce that r is trivially locally correct,
since r does not perform any output operation. Concerning p, we see that it eventually performs
one output operation send 0 [[[d+]d,r,q]e,q,p]e,q,p where e = !any_c;end_c. Since 0 ∈ any_c, we
deduce that p is also locally correct. Notice that, in order to decide whether p honors the contract
of d+, we only look at the topmost monitor wrapping d+ which, as we will see, reflects the local
knowledge of p concerning this endpoint. Concerning q, we observe that it eventually performs the
delegation send [d+]d,r,q [c-]c,p,q where c = !(!any_c;end_c);end_c. In particular, the message
being sent is an endpoint with contract d = !flat_c ( 6= 0);end_c whereas q is supposed to send
an endpoint with contract !any_c;end_c. Observe that !flat_c ( 6= 0);end_c 6 !any_c;end_c
because any_c 6 flat_c ( 6= 0) and entailment is contravariant with respect to outputs. That is,
q violates item 3 of Definition 6 and therefore it is not locally correct. 
Given that the conditions in Definition 6 are stated by actually running the process P in which
label p occurs, one could wonder whether their enforcement demands unreasonable skills (such
as divination or omniscience) to the programmer writing the code of p. The “local” qualification
in Definition 6 is meant to indicate that this is not the case, namely that the definition provides
effective guidance for writing correct code. We make two observations in this respect. First, all
the conditions of Definition 6 only concern actions that are actually performed by module p, not
by other modules. We concede that p may receive code from other modules (functions can be
sent as messages) and, if this happens, Definition 6 assumes such code to behave well too. This
assumption could be relaxed using a finer mechanism for associating blame labels with code Findler
and Felleisen [2002], but we leave this refinement for future work. The second observation is that
the contracts flat_c w, c, and d mentioned in conditions 1–5 are always found in the topmost
monitors wrapping messages and endpoints. Inspection of the rules in Table 3 reveals that these
contracts are always (continuations of) those advertised by a service previously invoked by p. We
can formalize this claim by showing that the negative label of every topmost monitor occurring
in module p is p itself. Given that labels do not migrate between monitors, this means that
the contract of the topmost monitor wrapping an endpoint in module p faithfully reflects the
knowledge of p about that endpoint.
Proposition 1. If P is a user process such that P →∗ Pp[c v1 · · · vn [_]_,_,q] where c ∈
{send, left, right}, then q = p.
In conclusion, the programmers of module p have all the information to consciously write
locally correct code if they know the contracts of the services invoked by p. This is the weakest
requirement we could reasonably ask.
Example 3. Consider again the processes of Example 2. The programmer of module p stat-
ically knows that the module is establishing a session with the service a whose contract is
c = ?(!any_c;end_c);end_c. According to this contract, the programmer assumes that the
endpoint y1 received from a can be used for sending any message, as specified by the contract
any_c, even though we know, by looking at the assignments determined in Example 2, that the
innermost monitor wrapping y1 specifies a stricter constraint. From the same assignments we also
see that c will indeed be the contract found in the topmost monitor wrapping y1. This means
that the assumptions made by the programmer concerning y1 correspond to the conditions that
determine the local correctness of the module p.
The programmer of module q statically knows that the module is establishing a session y1
with the service b whose contract is d = !(flat_c ( 6= 0));end_c. The same programmer is also
aware that module q is itself a service advertizing the contract c, which requires the service to
send on x1 an endpoint with contract e = !any_c;end_c. The mistake made by the programmer
15
is detectable by comparing d (the contract of the endpoint y1 that the service actually sends on
x1) and e (the contract of the endpoint that the service is supposed to send on x1) and noticing
that d 6 e. 
5.3 Local Correctness Implies Blame Soundness
A locally correct module p cannot be blamed. The key insight for proving this result is that
local correctness of p in a process P grants a number of global properties on the (busy) monitors
referring to p in P . Crucially, these properties hold anywhere in P (not just within module p) and
are invariant under arbitrary reductions of P .
Henceforth, we write P ⊃ e (or equivalently e ⊂ P ) if the sub-expression e occurs in P .
Definition 7 (module soundness). We say that module p is sound in P if:
1. P ⊃ [v]flat_c w,p,_ implies v ∈ w;
2. P ⊃ v /p e implies e ⇓ true;
3. P ⊃ [v /_ e]flat_c w,p,_ and e ⇓ true imply v ∈ w;
4. P ⊃ [[_]c,_,q]d,r,_ and p ∈ {q, r} imply c 6 d.
Conditions 1–3 state that all values v wrapped by a (busy) monitor where p is deemed re-
sponsible satisfy the contract/condition in the monitor. Condition 4 concerns stacked monitors
where p is either the positive or negative label depending on whether p occurs in the outermost or
innermost monitor. These configurations roughly correspond to casts Wadler and Findler [2009],
whereby a value that is supposed to satisfy some contract c is used in a place where a value that
satisfies d is expected. Regardless of whether p is the provider (p = r) or consumer (p = q) of
such value, the entailment c 6 d protects p in the sense that, if p risks of being blamed, another
module will be blamed beforehand.
The key lemma states that soundness of p is preserved by reductions of P , provided that p is
locally correct in P .
Lemma 1 (soundness preservation). If Γ ` P where Γ :: ω and p is locally correct and sound in
P and P → Q, then p is sound also in Q.
Blame soundness is an easy corollary of Lemma 1. Note that p is trivially sound in every user
process, since the clauses of Definition 7 solely concern the runtime syntax.
Theorem 2 (blame soundness). If Γ ` P where P is a user process and p is locally correct in P ,
then P →∗ Q implies blame p 6⊂ Q.
It is worth comparing Theorem 2 with similar results in the literature. The concepts most
closely related to blame soundness are blame correctness Dimoulas et al. [2011, 2012] and blame
safety Wadler and Findler [2009], Wadler [2015].
Blame correctness is a general property of a contract system guaranteeing that, whenever a
module p may be blamed for a contract violation, it is because a value owned by (i.e. generating
from) p is being checked against a flat contract which p was supposed to honor. In the literature,
this notion has arisen following the observation that alternative monitoring strategies may yield
different blame assignments Blume and McAllester [2006]. In contrast, blame soundness is a prop-
erty of a particular module p and is formulated as the logical transposition of blame correctness:
it states that, if p is never responsible for a contract violation, then p will never be blamed. This
difference between blame correctness and blame soundness is reflected also in the techniques used
for proving the two results. Blame correctness is proved by tracking the ownership of values and
the obligations of modules with respect to contracts. In particular, there is no concept akin to that
of “correct” module. The proof of blame soundness rests on a characterization of those modules
that do not violate contracts and is closer in style to a type safety result, where Lemma 1 plays
the role of subject reduction.
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The blame calculus Wadler and Findler [2009], Wadler [2015] is a model of programs comprising
both more-typed and less-typed modules. The interaction between modules adopting different
typing disciplines is governed by type casts that are checked at runtime and may trigger blames.
Blame safety is the property guaranteeing that, in case a blame is triggered, it always concerns
a less-typed module. A locally correct module can be seen as a software component providing
stronger guarantees about its behavior than those granted by the type system alone. In this sense,
blame soundness resembles blame safety in that it guarantees that blames always concern modules
that provide weaker guarantees about their correctness. Unlike well typing, local correctness is
formulated operationally and not through a set of typing rules.
6 OCaml Implementation
In Sections 3–5 we have presented the model of λCoS and studied its metatheory. With this formal
background, we now present a practical implementation of λCoS communication primitives and
session monitoring in OCaml. There are a few differences between the model and the implemen-
tation. Some concern the operational semantics and are suggested by practical considerations
(Section 6.1). Others concern OCaml’s type system, whose support for parametric polymorphism
and recursive types allows us to devise a more expressive API to our library of monitored sessions
(Section 6.2). We conclude the section with a final example that illustrates all these features at
work (Section 6.3).
6.1 Alternative Monitoring Semantics
According to the reduction rule [R15], when a session is initiated with a service a⇐cp v, the client
endpoint is monitored by the contract c advertised by the service and the service endpoint is
monitored by the dual contract computed by dual c. We dub this semantics, where each peer
of a session has its own monitor, double-sided monitoring in contrast to single-sided monitoring
where only one peer is wrapped. Having monitors on both peers assures the presence of at least
one chaperone contract for each endpoint in the system. To see the reason why this is technically
convenient, consider item 3 of Definition 6, which concerns delegations: the guarantee that there
is a monitor wrapping both the message and the endpoint on which the message is sent is a
direct consequence of double-sided monitoring (cf. rule [R15]) and allows us to easily refer to the
contracts c and d of the involved endpoints. Without this guarantee we would have four versions
of item 3, depending on whether each endpoint is monitored or not. Even worse, we would have
to compute the dual contract of each lone endpoint from that wrapping its peer, which could be
located anywhere in the system. With the guarantee that each endpoint is monitored, Definition 6
remains reasonably compact and need not refer to parts of the system other than module p.
In practice, double-sided monitoring induces a useless overhead because each message ex-
changed through the peer endpoints of a session is checked against the same contract twice, once
for each peer. This is a consequence of the fact that dual only inverts the direction of the exchanged
messages without affecting their contracts (rules [R8–R14]). The overhead caused by double-sided
monitoring is clearly illustrated by Example 2, where several values end up being wrapped by
adjacent monitors having the same contract and the same labels. We can eliminate this overhead
by adopting single-sided monitoring, where session initialization attaches just one monitor to the
client endpoint. From an operational standpoint, this amounts to replacing rule [R15] with
[R21] 〈E [connect a]〉p ‖ a⇐cq v 7→ (νb)(〈E [[b+]c,q,p]〉p ‖ 〈v b-〉q) ‖ a⇐cq v
that leaves b- unmonitored. While it is obvious that by removing one monitor we reduce the
points in the program that can generate blame, it is not entirely obvious that no new blame is
introduced. The next result guarantees that this is indeed the case:
Proposition 2. Let 7→ be the relation defined by the rules in Tables 2 and 3 except that [R15] is
replaced by [R21]. If P is a user process and P 7→∗⊃ blame p, then P →∗⊃ blame p.
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In fact we conjecture that the converse of Proposition 2 also holds, namely that single-sided
and double-sided monitoring yield the same blames. Proving this fact turns out not to be trivial
as the exact relationship between processes resulting from the two monitoring semantics is hard
to formalize. As it stands, Proposition 2 is enough to conclude that single-sided monitoring does
not affect the blame soundness result (Theorem 2).
We now turn the attention to the rules [R17–R20], which are defined in such a way that a single
reduction step rearranges a whole stack of monitors. This formulation of the operational semantics
– which we dub big-step monitoring – is convenient to prove various auxiliary results, including
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, which are key ingredients of blame soundness (Theorem 2). The issue
with big-step monitoring is that the contracts concerning a communicated message migrate along
with the message from the sender to the receiver. Given that contracts are ordinary expressions,
this migration is, in effect, a form of code mobility which may pose problems, especially in a
distributed system. In addition, the message is not checked against the contracts on the sender side
until the communication has completed. This means that contract violations might go undetected
if, for instance, a deadlock or livelock prevents the communication from occurring.
For these reasons, it makes sense to consider a small-step monitoring semantics that deals with
monitors one at a time and that is closer in style to the semantics given by Findler and Felleisen
[2002]. We illustrate small-step monitoring for a communication across endpoints monitored by
non-dependent contracts. Communication goes through two distinct phases. During the first
phase, the monitors on the endpoints are disassembled and distributed on the message and around
the whole applications involving send and receive. Formally:
[R22] send v [ε]!c;d,σ  [send [v]c,¬σ ε]d,σ
[R23] receive [ε]?c;d,σ  let x,y = receive ε in ([x]c,σ,[y]d,σ)
Once all the contracts have been stripped off and suitably rearranged/checked, the actual
communication may take place:
[R24] 〈E [send v aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive aι]〉q  〈E [aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[(v,aι)]〉q
With small-step monitoring, contract migration only happens during the communication of
endpoints (delegations). Arguably, the contexts in which this form of communication is allowed
also allow for the migration of contracts. In addition, rule [R22] makes sure that messages different
from endpoints are checked against contracts before the send can reduce further because [v]c,¬σ
is not a value when c is a flat contract. This means that these checks are performed even if
the communication does not occur and their cost is charged to the sender. We illustrate these
differences between big-step and small-step monitoring in the following example.
Example 4. Let P be the parallel composition
〈let x = send 0 [a+]!flat_c (6= 0);end_c,q,p in
let y = send 1 [b+]!any_c;end_c,q,p in
close x;close y〉p
∥∥∥∥∥∥
〈let _,y = receive [b-]?any_c;end_c,p,q in
let _,x = receive [a-]?flat_c (6= 0);end_c,p,q in
close x;close y〉q
where p is sending two messages (0 and 1) and q is waiting for them. Notice that p is sending a
message on a+ first and then on b+, whereas q is waiting for a message from b- first and then a-.
Because of the different order of communications (and of the synchronous communication model
used in λCoS), the process P is stuck according to the big-step monitoring semantics. That is,
P X→. Notice also that p is violating the contract of a+, which requires the message to be a number
different from 0. Because of the deadlock, this violation is not detected by the big-step monitoring
semantics. On the contrary, under small-step monitoring the p thread reduces thus
〈let x = send 0 [a+]!flat_c (6= 0);end_c,q,p in · · ·〉p
 〈let x = [send [0]flat_c ( 6= 0),p,q a+]end_c,q,p in · · ·〉p by [R22]
→ 〈let x = [send (0 /p ( 6=) 0 0) a+]end_c,q,p in · · ·〉p by [R5]
→ 〈let x = [send (0 /p false) a+]end_c,q,p in · · ·〉p semantics of 6=
→ 〈let x = [send (blame p) a+]end_c,q,p in · · ·〉p by [R7]
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yielding a blame for p even if the communication does not occur. 
It is possible to prove a (limited) form of equivalence between big-step and small-step moni-
toring by considering those configurations where a communication is about to occur:
Proposition 3. Let  be the relation defined by the rules in Tables 2 and 3 except that rule [R17]
is replaced by [R22–R24]. If
P
def
= 〈E [send v [aι]!c;d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive[aι]?e;f,%]〉q
Q1
def
= 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[(v,[aι]f,%)]〉q
Q2
def
= 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q
then either
1. P  ∗ Q and P →∗ Q for some Q ∈ {Q1, Q2}, or
2. P  ∗⊃ blame r and Q→∗⊃ blame r for some r.
In words, regardless of the monitoring semantics and starting from a configuration involving a
sender and a receiver, either the reduction converges to the same state Qi in which the message has
been successfully delivered to the destination, or the same module r is blamed by both semantics.
There are two possible resulting states Q1 and Q2 depending on whether v is a ground value or
a (monitored) endpoint. In the first case, the monitors around v turn into busy monitors and
eventually disappear. In the second case, they accumulate around v. Analogous results can be
proven for all the other configurations involving communication primitives.
We also note that the small-step semantics provides for greater flexibility in that it allows
the reduction of configurations where stacked monitors have a mixture of dependent and non-
dependent contracts because each monitor is handled individually.
Despite these differences between big-step and small-step monitoring, the given criterion of
local correctness and the blame soundness result are also relevant for our implementation. After
all, what small-step monitoring does is to introduce a number of intermediate steps in which the
relationships between adjacent monitors are (temporarily) lost and where the actual knowledge of
the programmer with respect to the contract of the used endpoints is not as easy to characterize
as in Proposition 1. In case communications are guaranteed to occur, Proposition 3 shows that
both monitoring semantics either yield the same blame or eventually converge to the same reduct.
A difference remains in that the thread from which the blame originates may not be the same:
in the big-step monitoring semantics it is always the receiver of a message that possibly detects a
violation (cf. thread r in Example 2), whereas in the small-step monitoring semantics checks are
in general performed on both sides of the session and the sender may yield blames too (cf. thread
p in Example 4).
6.2 Monitoring Sessions in OCaml
In this section we illustrate the key aspects of an OCaml module that implements λCoS commu-
nication primitives. Instead of building the primitives from scratch, we obtain them as wrappers
of the corresponding primitives provided by FuSe, an OCaml library of binary sessions Padovani
[2017]. This way we do not have to delve into low-level details concerning the encoding of session
types or the implementation of the session primitives and instead we can focus on the aspects
strictly related to contract monitoring. The fact that we can build λCoS primitives on top of FuSe
is a sign that our monitoring technique is modular and should be portable to other session libraries
for possibly different programming languages.
Even though FuSe has its own OCaml representation of session types, we keep using the
metavariables T and S to improve readability. In particular, we write T st for the OCaml type that
denotes a lone (i.e., unmonitored) FuSe endpoint with session type T . Similarly, we write T mt
for the OCaml type that denotes a possibly monitored endpoint. OCaml’s support for parametric
polymorphism in conjunction to FuSe’s representation of session types makes it possible to also
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represent session type variables standing for unknown session types. Hereafter we use A, B to
range over session type variables and A st, A mt for their corresponding representations in FuSe
and our λCoS implementation. The FuSe representation of session types makes it easy to switch
from a session type to its dual Padovani [2017]. We will write A st to refer to the dual of A st.
Concerning the session communication primitives, we use the prefix FuSe to disambiguate them
from those we are going to implement. As an example,
FuSe.send : α→ !α.A st→ A st
is the signature of the send primitive provided by FuSe, which we will use for providing a suitable
wrapper
send : α→ !α.A mt→ A mt
Following Hinze et al. [2006], we represent the contract forms introduced in Section 3 using
the constructors of a generalized algebraic data type (GADT):
1 type [_] =
2 | Flat : (α→ bool)→ [α]
3 | End : [end]
4 | Receive : [α] * (α→ [A mt])→ [?α.A mt]
5 | Send : [α] * (α→ [A mt])→ [!α.A mt]
6 | Branch : [bool] * [A mt] * [B mt]→ [A &B mt]
7 | Choice : [bool] * [A mt] * [B mt]→ [A ⊕B mt]
According to the OCaml syntax for GADTs, the type parameter of the data type is left unspec-
ified (see _ on line 1) and each constructor is explicitly annotated with its type (lines 2–7). These
contract constructors are in close correspondence with those of Table 1 and are kept private in
our OCaml module for λCoS which instead exports one (curried) function for each of them. For
example, flat_c is defined thus
let flat_c w = Flat w
In OCaml the function flat_c is polymorphic and has type (α→ bool)→ [α], hence it can
be used to define flat contracts on values of any type. The typical example is any_c : [α] used in
several occasions and defined below:
let any_c = Flat (fun _→ true)
Unlike λCoS, OCaml’s type system is not substructural and there is no distinction between
linear and unlimited types. Consequently, we cannot statically ensure that flat contracts are used
only for unlimited values. As we will see shortly, violations on the usage of flat contracts will be
detected dynamically using a runtime check.
The remaining costructors are in correspondence with the contract forms for session endpoints.
In particular, End describes an endpoint that can only be closed. We have:
let end_c = End
Send is the constructor for a dependent output contract, which is built up from a contract
[α] for the communicated value and a function (α→ [A mt]) that generates the continuation
contract. The corresponding combinator send_d is defined thus:
let send_d k1 k2 = Send (k1, k2)
The lack of distinction between linear and unlimited types in OCaml allows us to define non-
dependent contract combinators as particular instances of the corresponding dependent version.
Thus, we have
let send_c k1 k2 = send_d k1 (fun _→ k2)
The primitives receive_c, receive_d, choice_c, and branch_c are defined similarly. As
pointed out by a reviewer, it is also sensible to provide specializations of choice_c and branch_c
that mandate the selection of a particular branch. For instance
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let left_choice_c k = choice_c (flat_c id) k any_c
let right_choice_c k = choice_c (flat_c not) any_c k
can be used to specify that the user of an endpoint is required to select the left (respectively, right)
branch of a choice. Indeed, the (flat_c id) contract is satisfied by the true label whereas the
(flat_c not) contract is satisfied by the false label.
It is now time to provide the concrete representation of a λCoS endpoints as possibly monitored
FuSe endpoints. In general we have to take into account the possibility that an endpoint is wrapped
by an arbitrary number of monitors, each carrying a chaperone contract. For this reason, we use
a recursive data type:
type A mt =
| Channel of linearity_tag_type * A st
| Monitor of [A mt] * string * string * A mt
Note that this definition and the GADT for contracts are mutually dependent and must be
introduced jointly in OCaml. Here we have kept them separate for the sake of a more gradual
presentation. The Channel constructor represents a lone endpoint (cf. Table 1) and consists of
a FuSe endpoint and a linearity tag, which will be used for the runtime detection of linearity
violations on flat contracts. The definition of linearity_tag_type is uninteresting. We only
remark that it is a singleton type whose unique inhabitant is kept private to the module and can
only occur in a Channel constructor. The Monitor constructor represents a monitored endpoint,
consisting of a contract (of type [A mt]), two blame labels (of type string), and an underlying,
possibly monitored endpoint of type A mt.
We now illustrate in detail the implementation of send, the other communication primitives
are analogous. Recall that send has two arguments, a message v and an endpoint ep on which
v must be transmitted, and returns the same endpoint (cf. Table 3). Keeping this in mind, we
have:
1 let rec send v =
2 function
3 | Channel (lin, ep)→ Channel (lin, FuSe.send v ep)
4 | Monitor (Send (k, w), pos, neg, ep)→
5 wrap (w v) pos neg (send (wrap k neg pos v) ep)
6 | Monitor (Flat _, _, _, _)→ assert false (* IMPOSSIBLE *)
The case when ep is a lone endpoint (line 3) corresponds to the reduction rule [R24] and consists
in invoking the corresponding FuSe primitive and turning the resulting FuSe endpoint into a λCoS
endpoint through the Channel constructor. The case when ep is a monitored endpoint (lines 4–5)
corresponds to the reduction rule [R22]. In this case, the contract is disassembled into a contract k
for the message being transmitted and a function w that is applied to the message to compute the
continuation contract. The auxiliary function wrap (described shortly) takes care of checking that
contracts are satisfied or attaches chaperone contracts to session endpoints. Note the swapping
of blame labels in the inner application of wrap and the recursive application of send, which
takes care of others chaperone contracts in ep and eventually performs the communication. The
last case in the definition of send (line 6) never applies and is only meant to prevent complaints
about a non-exhaustive pattern matching. The point is that when send is applied to a monitored
endpoint Monitor (k, _, _, ep) the type of send ensures that k has type [!α.A mt] and the
only constructors whose type is unifiable with this one are Send and Flat, which applies to any
value but is never attached as a chaperone contract by wrap.
The last key ingredient of the implementation is indeed wrap, whose purpose is to check whether
a value satisfies a given contract and to blame the guilty party if this is not the case. The structure
of wrap, shown below, is analogous to that of the homonymous function defined by Findler and
Felleisen [2002], the main difference being that, in our case, wrap deals with contracts concerning
session endpoints.
1 let wrap : type a. a ct→ string→ string→ a→ a = fun k pos neg v→
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2 match k with
3 | Flat w → if unlimited v && w v then v else raise (Blame pos)
4 | End as k → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)
5 | Receive _ as k→ Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)
6 | Send _ as k → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)
7 | Branch _ as k → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)
8 | Choice _ as k → Monitor (k, pos, neg, v)
An application wrap k pos neg v inspects the structure of the contract k (line 2). When k
is a flat contract the message is verified to be unlimited and to satisfy the predicate w (line 3).
If both conditions are satisfied, the value v is returned. On the contrary, the sender is blamed
for a contract violation. The unlimited auxiliary function is implemented by checking that (the
runtime representation of) v does not contain any occurrence of linear_tag. Overall, this case in
the definition of wrap corresponds to the rules [R5–R7] in Table 2. In the remaining cases (lines 4–
8), wrap cannot check immediately whether the endpoint satisfies the contract k. Therefore, the
endpoint is wrapped by a monitor with the contract k and the blame labels pos and neg. Two
remarks about the typing of wrap are in order. First, it is necessary to provide a type annota-
tion to wrap (line 1) to inform OCaml that the type parameter α is locally abstract (the explicit
quantification type α means this). This way, OCaml can refine this type parameter depending on
pattern matching Garrigue and Normand [2011]. Second, the lines 5–9 cannot be collapsed into
a single case, even if they all bind just one variable k and the right hand side of each pattern
matching rule is behaviorally the same, for the type of k is different in each case.
6.3 Extended Example: List Forwarding
In this section we present a final example that illustrates all the features of the OCaml imple-
mentation of λCoS, including dependent contracts. We also take advantage of OCaml’s support
for parametric polymorphism and recursive types, which we have omitted in the formal model of
λCoS for the sake of simplicity.
The following function
1 let forwarder_body x =
2 let rec aux y =
3 function
4 | [] → close (right y)
5 | v :: l→ aux (send v (left y)) l in
6 let l, x = receive x in (* receive the elements to be forwarded *)
7 let y, x = receive x in (* receive the destination endpoint *)
8 close x; aux y l
models the body of a forwarding service that delivers a list of elements to a given recipient, one
element at a time. The service interacts with the client using the endpoint x, from which it receives
a list l of elements (line 6) and another endpoint y on which the elements of the list should be
forwarded (line 7). The main loop of the service (lines 2–5) iterates over the list: when the list
is empty (line 4), the service selects the “right” branch of the protocol and closes the endpoint;
when the list contains at least one element v, the service selects the “left” branch of the protocol,
it sends v on y, and then iterates over the tail of the list (line 5).
OCaml infers for forwarder_body the signature
val forwarder_body : ?(α list).?(rec A.(!α.A) ⊕ end).end mt→ unit
where rec A.(!α.A) ⊕ end stands for the equi-recursive session type T that satisfies the equation
T = (!α.T) ⊕ end.1 As the type suggests, forwarder_body performs an arbitrary number of
outputs on the delegated endpoint y, and by parametricity we also deduce that the elements
1The type inferred by OCaml is in fact an encoded form of the type shown here. FuSe comes along with a utility
that pretty prints encoded OCaml types into the more readable syntax that we have used.
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being sent in these outputs must come from the list l. However, we do not know whether the
number of forwarded elements actually matches the length of the list. The service can advertise
this guarantee by means of the following contract:
1 let forwarder_c =
2 let rec fwd n =
3 if n > 0 then (* more list elements *)
4 left_choice_c (send_c any_c (fwd (n - 1)))
5 else (* no more list elements *)
6 right_choice_c end_c
7 in send_d any_c (fun l→ send_c (fwd (List.length l)) end_c)
The contract starts with the specification of the output of a list l for which no particular
constraints are given (cf. the any_c on line 7). However, the continuation contract depends on the
length of l. More precisely, the continuation describes an endpoint that must be used for sending
another endpoint with contract fwd (List.length l) before being closed. The expression fwd n
(lines 2–6) yields a contract for an endpoint that must be used for sending exactly n messages.
This is achieved using the left_choice_c and right_choice_c contracts. If n > 0 the forwarder
must select the left branch and then send one message followed by n - 1 more (line 4). If n is 0
the forwarder must select the right branch and then terminate the interaction (line 6).
We conclude with two remarks. First, the contract forwarder_c allows forwarder_body to
change the forwarded messages as long as their number is the same as the length of l. Parametricity
only guarantees that the forwarded elements come from l. A stronger version of the contract could
be written by making fwd a function that operates over the list of remaining messages and adding a
condition over sent messages that checks whether the forwarded message is on the list of messages
to be delivered. Second, the forwarder_c contract ties the behavior of a process on one session
(y) to data (l) exchanged over a different session (x). Therefore, besides providing a means for
specifying precise constraints over messages exchanged in one session, contracts for higher-order
sessions enable the specification of inter-session dependencies.
7 Related Work
Blame Correctness. Blame assignment with higher-order and dependent contracts is subtle
because contract verification is deferred until the monitored object is actually used. In fact, alter-
native monitoring strategies called lax, picky and indy have been proposed Blume and McAllester
[2006], Dimoulas et al. [2011], Greenberg et al. [2012]. Such design choices pose the question
of whether a particular strategy is reasonable, i.e., if it assigns blames correctly. This problem
has been addressed either by showing that principals that can be blamed have responsibility in a
contract violation Dimoulas et al. [2011, 2012] or by providing a characterization of components
that satisfy a given contract Blume and McAllester [2006], Findler and Blume [2006], Dimoulas
and Felleisen [2011]. Given a semantics for contracts, contract satisfaction addresses the problem
of showing that a contract system is sound and complete with respect to that semantics, i.e. that
each blame assigned by the system corresponds to a contract violation and each contract viola-
tion is detected by the system. Our blame soundness result partially addresses this problem by
showing that the contract system does not report blames when a component does not violate its
contracts. The exact relationship between blame soundness and contract satisfaction remains to
be fully understood.
Contracts have been integrated into type systems as refinement types, which are checked
dynamically via cast insertion, like the hybrid types of Knowles and Flanagan [2010]. The relation
between contracts and hybrid types has been studied by Greenberg et al. [2012] and Gronski and
Flanagan [2007]. Wadler and Findler [2009] provide a unifying view with the blame calculus, but
leave dependent contracts for future work. The blame calculus allows for a simple characterization
of correct component when typed and untyped code are mixed. The blame theorem shows that
blames are always assigned to the lesser-typed components.
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Although contracts in λCoS do not interact with the type system, our notions of local correct-
ness and blame soundness have been inspired by Wadler and Findler [2009] and Wadler [2015].
Communication over a monitored endpoint is the only point in the execution of a program that
can originate a blame. We interpret communication as an implicit cast in which the message is
coerced to the type specified in the contract wrapping the endpoint. However, contract satisfac-
tion is verified dynamically in our approach. We leave the problem of static verification of session
contracts, e.g., along the lines of Nguyen et al. [2014], as future work.
Behavioral/Temporal Higher-order Contracts. The interplay between higher-order con-
tracts and behavioral/temporal aspects of modules, such as restricting the order in which func-
tions can be invoked, has been previously addressed by Disney et al. [2011] and Scholliers et al.
[2015]. In both approaches, the enforcement of temporal constraints is done dynamically and
the contract language allows for the specification of both allowed and disallowed traces. On the
contrary, in λCoS, the usage of endpoints is regulated by a combination of static and dynamic
constraints: static constraints are enforced by session types, which guarantee that processes use
session endpoints according to their protocol; dynamic constraints, which concern the content of
exchanged messages and may affect the selection and availability of choices and branches (Sec-
tion 6.3), are checked at runtime by monitors. None of the previous works on behavioral/temporal
contracts Scholliers et al. [2015], Disney et al. [2011] provides a characterisation of module correct-
ness or a formal statement about the correctness of blame assignment akin to our blame soundness
result (Section 5).
Swords et al. [2015] proposed λCC, a language tailored to the implementation of alternative
approaches to monitoring, and discussed a possible implementation of the temporal contracts of
Disney et al. [2011] on top of λCC. An interesting question for future work is whether the primitives
of λCC allows for a convenient implementation of λCoS to avoid monitor migration in delegations.
Contracts and Affine/Linear Types. Contract monitoring may duplicate values and discard
contracts (Tables 2 and 3). These aspects have not been investigated elsewhere and affect the
typing of contract constructors when the type system is substructural. If we allowed contracts to
use linear resources, the monitoring of a non-linear object with a contract using linear resources
would affect the behavior of the object, which would become linear itself. In this sense, our
contracts conform to the definition of “chaperone contracts” given by Strickland et al. [2012],
where chaperones are not allowed to affect the behavior of monitored objects.
Tov and Pucella [2010] use stateful contracts for controlling the usage of affine functions (func-
tions that can be applied at most once) when these flow into a region of the program that uses a
conventional (i.e., non substructural) type system.
Projections and Duality. Contract duality is tightly related to session type duality Honda
[1993], Honda et al. [1998] and should not be confused with the client and server projections
of Findler and Blume [2006]. The point is that dual contracts describe the same obligations in
a session with respect to complementary directions of the messages being exchanged, whereas
projection separates the obligations for values flowing into and out of a monitored expression.
Contracts for Sessions. Bocchi et al. [2010] and Toninho and Yoshida [2016] extend global
types with assertions to specify constraints on values communicated in a multiparty session. These
approaches are based on a top-down methodology whereby the whole multiparty interaction is
designed at once and then projected on the single participants of the session. We work with binary
sessions only. Our contracts can be applied gradually to arbitrary subsets of interacting modules
and can be used to describe whole protocols or only fragments thereof. The session type is inferred
automatically from the structure of the program. Bocchi et al. [2010] use a decidable assertion
logic and Toninho and Yoshida [2016] use dependent session types along the lines of Toninho
et al. [2011]. These choices make it possible to verify the correctness of participants statically.
The soundness result rests on the assumption that all processes participating in a session are
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well typed, requiring no runtime monitoring. This assumption is relaxed in some works Chen
et al. [2011], Bocchi et al. [2013], where participants may misbehave and a monitor is used to
suppress messages that violate the protocol. Neither higher-order sessions nor blame assignment
are considered in these works.
Monitoring of untrusted processes has been also used Bartoletti et al. [2012, 2013], Jia et al.
[2016] to make sure that processes follow the intended protocol (session fidelity) and to assign
blame if this is not the case. In these works monitoring does not concern the content of messages
and blame freedom can be guaranteed by typing. In λCoS session fidelity is ensured by typing
whereas contracts specify conditions on the content of exchanged messages.
Thiemann [2014] studies a gradual type system for sessions with explicit coercions for branches
and choices. Again, the dynamic checks concern session fidelity and particularly the branching
structure of protocols.
8 Concluding Remarks
Building on contracts for higher-order functions pioneered by Findler and Felleisen [2002] and
later extended to mutable objects by Strickland et al. [2012] we have defined and implemented
a monitoring technique for higher-order sessions. Its characterizing aspect is that the contract
wrapping a session endpoint must be dynamically updated at runtime, as the session progresses.
The setting provided us with the opportunity to investigate the ramifications of contract moni-
toring in the presence of linear resources. In particular, we have seen that session endpoints should
not occur in contracts, which is in line with the observation that contracts should be “pure” Meyer
[1992]. Indeed, the operations involved with session endpoints are inherently impure.
We have proved a blame soundness result stating that modules which do not violate contracts
are not blamed. The result rests on the key assumption that messages are either session endpoints
or unlimited values (i.e. data and functions not containing session endpoints). This assumption
allows us to tackle the higher-order case through delegation, which is the idiomatic form of mobility
in sessions. Extending the blame soundness result to a setting where functions may contain session
endpoints is an intriguing future development.
We intend to incorporate our proof-of-concept implementation of chaperone contracts for ses-
sions into FuSe Padovani [2017]. In this respect, the GADT presented in Section 6 suffers from
two important limitations. First, the GADT does not allow the specification of contracts for struc-
tured data types (such as pairs) containing session endpoints. This can be overcome either by
adding dedicated constructors corresponding to these data types Hinze et al. [2006] or by adding a
single, general-purpurse constructor that carries a user-provided, type-specific wrapper function.
The second current limitation is that recursively defined constracts (such as forwarder_c in Sec-
tion 6.3) must be finite in general. The finiteness of forwarder_c was guaranteed by the fact
that its structure is isomorphic to that of a (finite) list. However, infinite protocols are commonly
found in practice. In these cases, a contract definition relying on OCaml’s support for recursion
would diverge. This limitation can be lifted by adding a constructor to the GADT that lazily
computes the fixpoint of a recursively defined contract. Once all these ingredients are in place, a
proper evaluation of the overhead induced by our technique for contract monitoring is in order.
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A Supplement to Section 3
We write fn(P ) for the set of free names of P .
Below are the reduction rules of processes that we have omitted from Table 3.
[R25]
e→ e′
〈e〉p → 〈e′〉p
[R26]
P → Q
P ‖R→ Q ‖R
[R27]
P → Q
(νa)P → (νa)Q
[R28]
P ≡ P ′ P ′ → Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
P → Q
Rule [R25] lifts reduction from expressions to processes, and rules [R26–R28] close reductions
under parallel compositions, sessions, and structural congruence ≡, which is the least congruence
that satisfies the axioms below:
P ‖Q ≡ Q ‖ P P ‖ (Q ‖R) ≡ (P ‖Q) ‖R 〈()〉p ‖ P ≡ P
a, a+, a- 6∈ fn(Q)
(νa)P ‖Q ≡ (νa)(P ‖Q)
In several of the proofs that follow we implicitly use the next results, stating that the reduction
of expressions is deterministic.
Proposition 4. If e→ e1 and e→ e2, then e1 = e2.
Proof. By inspecting the definition of → and that of evaluation contexts.
Proposition 5. If e ⇓ v and e→ e′, then e′ ⇓ v.
Proof. By definition of e ⇓ v we have e = e0 → e1 → · · · → en = v for some n ≥ 0. From the
hypothesis e→ e′ and Proposition 4 we deduce e′ = e1. We conclude e′ ⇓ v.
B Supplement to Section 4
Definition 8 (subkinding). Let ≤ be the least total order on kinds such that ω ≤ 1. We say that
κ1 is subkind of κ2 if κ1 ≤ κ2.
The following lemma relates the kind of a value with that of the environment in which it is
typed.
Lemma 2. If Γ ` v : t and t :: κ, then Γ :: κ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of v and by cases on its shape.
Case v = cn v1 · · · vn. Then Γ = Γ0 + Γ1 + · · · + Γn and Γ0 :: ω and Γ0 ` cn : t1 →κ1 · · · →κn−1
tn →κn t and Γi ` vi : ti for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By inspecting Table 4 we observe that t :: κ implies
ti :: κ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By induction hypothesis we deduce Γi :: κ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, hence
we conclude Γ :: κ.
Case v = λx.e. From [t-fun] we deduce t = t1 →κ′ t2 where κ′ ≤ κ and Γ :: κ′, hence we conclude
Γ :: κ.
Case v = aι. Then Γ = Γ ′, aι : t. From [t-name] we deduce Γ ′ :: ω hence we conclude Γ :: κ.
Case v = [v1]
v2,p,q. From [t-monitor] we deduce Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and Γ1 ` v1 : t and Γ2 ` v2 : [t]. By
induction hypothesis we deduce Γ1 :: κ and Γ2 :: ω, hence we conclude Γ :: κ.
Lemma 3. If Γ ` e : t, then fn(e) ⊆ dom(Γ).
Proof. A simple induction on the derivation of Γ ` e : t.
The type system enjoys an almost standard weakening property. Note that weakening is allowed
for unlimited environments only.
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Lemma 4 (weakening). If Γ1 ` e : t and Γ1 + Γ2 is defined and Γ2 :: ω, then Γ1 + Γ2 ` e : t.
Proof. A simple induction on the derivation of Γ1 ` e : t.
Lemma 5 (substitution). If (1) Γ1, x : s ` e : t and (2) Γ2 ` v : s and (3) Γ1 + Γ2 is defined, then
Γ1 + Γ2 ` e{v/x} : t.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (1) and by cases on the last rule applied. We only discuss
a few significant cases.
Case [t-const]. Then e = c for some constant c and (Γ1, x : s) :: ω. In particular, s :: ω. From
Lemma 2 we deduce Γ2 :: ω and we conclude with one application of [t-const].
Case [t-name]. Then e = u and Γ1, x : s = Γ
′, u : s′ where Γ ′ :: ω. We distinguish three subcases,
depending on whether u is an endpoint or a variable other than x or x itself. If u = aι or u = y 6= x,
then s :: ω. From Lemma 2 we deduce Γ2 :: ω and we conclude with one application of [t-name]. If
u = x, then e{v/x} = v and we conclude from (2) and Lemma 4.
Case [t-fun]. Then e = λy.e′. Without loss of generality we may assume that x 6= y, hence from
[t-fun] we deduce t = t′ →κ t′′ and Γ1, x : s, y : t′ ` e′ : t′′ and (Γ1, x : s) :: κ. From Lemma 2 we
deduce Γ2 :: κ. By induction hypothesis we deduce (Γ1 + Γ2), y : t
′ ` e′{v/x} : t′′ where Γ1 + Γ2 :: κ.
We conclude with one application of [t-fun].
Case [t-app]. Then e = e1e2 and Γ , x : s = Γ1 + Γ2 where Γ1 ` e1 : t′ →κ t and Γ2 ` e2 : t′. We
distinguish three sub-cases. If x ∈ dom(Γ1) \ dom(Γ2), then from Lemma 3 we deduce x 6∈ fn(e2)
and Γ1 = Γ
′
1, x : s. By induction hypothesis we deduce Γ
′
1 + Γ2 ` e1{v/x} : t′ →κ t and we
conclude with one application of [t-app]. If x ∈ dom(Γ2) \ dom(Γ1), then from Lemma 3 we deduce
x 6∈ fn(e1) and Γ2 = Γ ′2, x : s. By induction hypothesis we deduce Γ ′2 + Γ2 ` e2{v/x} : t′ and
we conclude with one application of [t-app]. If x ∈ dom(Γ1) ∩ dom(Γ2), then Γ1 = Γ ′1, x : s and
Γ2 = Γ
′
2, x : s. From Definition 3 we deduce s :: ω and, from Lemma 2, also Γ2 :: ω. Therefore,
Γ2 + Γ2 = Γ2, again by Definition 3. By induction hypothesis we derive Γ
′
1 + Γ2 ` e1{v/x} : t′ →κ t
and Γ ′2 + Γ2 ` e2{v/x} : t′. We conclude with one application of [t-app].
Lemma 6 (subject reduction for expressions). If Γ ` e : t and e→ e′, then Γ ` e′ : t.
Proof. By cases on the rule used to derive e→ e′. We only discuss a few representative cases.
Case [R1]. Then e = (λx.e′′)v → e′′{v/x} = e′. From [t-app] we deduce that Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and
Γ1 ` λx.e′′ : s→κ t and Γ2 ` v : s and Γ1 :: κ. Using Lemma 5 we conclude Γ1 + Γ2 ` e′′{v/x} : t.
Case [R5]. Then e = [v]flat_c w,p,q → v /p wv = e′. From [t-monitor] we deduce Γ = Γ1 + Γ2
and Γ1 ` v : t and Γ2 ` flat_c w : [t]. From [t-app] and the type scheme of flat_c we deduce
Γ2 = Γ21 + Γ22 and Γ21 ` flat_c : (t → bool) → [t] and t :: ω and Γ22 ` w : t → bool. From
Lemma 2 we deduce Γ1 :: ω, hence Γ1 + Γ1 = Γ1 by Definition 3. We conclude with one application
of [t-app] and one of [t-busy-monitor].
Case [R11]. Then e = dual !c.w → ?c.(λx.dual (wx)) = e′ and t = [T] for some T . From [t-app]
and the type scheme of dual we deduce Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and Γ1 ` dual : [T]→ [T] and Γ2 ` !c.w :
[T]. From Lemma 2 we deduce Γ1 :: ω and Γ2 :: ω. From [t-app] and the type scheme of receive_d
we deduce Γ2 = Γ21 + Γ22 + Γ23 and T = !s.S and Γ21 ` receive_d : [s] → (s → [S]) → [T]
and Γ22 ` c : [s] and Γ23 ` w : s → [S]. From Definition 3 we deduce Γ2i :: ω for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
From [t-fun] and [t-app] we deduce Γ23 ` λx.dual (wx) : s → [S]. We conclude with two
applications of [t-app].
Next are two results that allow us to reason on the typability of a sub-expression that occurs
in the hole of an evaluation context and on the fact that such sub-expression can be replaced by
another one having the same type.
Lemma 7 (typability of subterms). If D is a derivation of Γ ` E [e] : t, then there exist Γ1, Γ2,
and s such that Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and D has a sub-derivation D ′ concluding Γ1 ` e : s and the position
of D ′ in D corresponds to the position of [ ] in E .
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Proof. By induction on E .
Lemma 8 (replacement). If:
1. D is a derivation of Γ1 + Γ2 ` E [e] : t,
2. D ′ is a sub-derivation of D concluding that Γ2 ` e : s,
3. the position of D ′ in D corresponds to the position of [ ] in E ,
4. Γ3 ` e′ : s,
5. Γ1 + Γ3 is defined,
then Γ1 + Γ3 ` E [e′] : t.
Proof. By induction on E .
The next result states the obvious property that typing of processes is preserved by structural
congruence.
Lemma 9. If Γ ` P and P ≡ Q, then Γ ` Q.
Proof. An easy induction on the derivation of P ≡ Q and by cases on the last rule applied.
In order to state subject reduction for processes, we must take into account the fact that
the type associated with session endpoints may change as these endpoints are used for commu-
nication. For this reason, we define a reduction relation for type environments that simulates
communications as performed by processes at the level of types.
Definition 9 (reduction of type environments). We write → for the least relation between type
environments such that:
[R29] Γ , aι : !t.T, aι : ?t.S → Γ , aι : T, aι : S
[R30] Γ , aι : T1 ⊕ T2, a
ι : S1 & S2 → Γ , aι : T1, aι : S1
[R31] Γ , aι : T1 ⊕ T2, a
ι : S1 & S2 → Γ , aι : T2, aι : S2
and we write →∗ for the reflexive, transitive closure of →.
Definition 10 (balanced type environment). We say that Γ is balanced if aι, aι ∈ dom(Γ) implies
Γ(aι) = Γ(aι).
Note that every environment Γ such that Γ :: ω is trivially balanced, since it has no session
endpoints in its domain. We need a few properties that concern the reduction of type environments:
Proposition 6. Let Γ → Γ ′. The following properties hold:
1. If Γ is balanced, then Γ ′ is balanced as well.
2. If Γ + Γ ′′ is defined, then Γ + Γ ′′ → Γ ′ + Γ ′′.
Proof. Trivial from Definitions 9 and 10.
In the proof of the following Lemma we introduce some handy abbreviations for dealing with
sets of environments and sets of judgments. In particular, we write Γ in place of Γ1 + · · · + Γn
where Γ1 + · · · + Γn = Γ and we write Γ ` e : t in place of a set of judgments Γi ` ei : ti (usually
the ti are all the same type).
Lemma 10. If Γ is balanced and Γ ` P and P → Q, then there exists Γ ′ such that Γ →∗ Γ ′ and
Γ ′ ` Q.
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of P → Q and by cases on the last rule applied. We only
discuss a few representative cases.
Case [R17]. Then we have
P = 〈E [send v [aι]!c;d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive [aι]?e;f,%]〉q
Q = 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q
Let P1 and P2 be the two threads in P . From [t-par] we deduce Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and Γi ` Pi for
every i = 1, 2. From [t-thread] we deduce Γ1 ` E [· · ·] : unit and Γ2 ` E ′[· · ·] : unit, where we have
elided the expressions in the holes of E and E ′.
From Lemma 7, [t-app] and the type scheme of send we deduce the following facts:
• Γ1 = Γ10 + Γ11 + Γ12 + Γ13 + Γ14 + Γ15;
• Γ11 ` send : t→ !t.T →κ T where t :: κ;
• Γ12 ` v : t;
• Γ13 ` aι : !t.T , hence Γ13 = Γ ′′13, aι : !t.T where Γ ′′13 :: ω;
• Γ14 ` c : [t] and Γ15 ` d : [T].
From Lemma 7, [t-app] and the type scheme of receive we deduce the following facts:
• Γ2 = Γ20 + Γ21 + Γ22 + Γ23 + Γ24;
• Γ21 ` receive : ?s.S → s× S;
• Γ22 ` aι : ?s.S, hence Γ22 = Γ ′22, aι : ?s.S where Γ ′22 :: ω;
• Γ23 ` e : [s] and Γ24 ` f : [S].
From Lemma 2 we deduce Γ11 :: ω and Γ21 :: ω. From the hypothesis that Γ is balanced we
deduce that !t.T = ?s.S, that is t = s and T = S or, equivalently, T = S.
Let Γ ′13
def
= Γ ′′13, a
ι : T and Γ ′22
def
= Γ ′′22, a
ι : T . From [t-name] and [t-monitor] we deduce Γ ′13 + Γ15 `
[aι]d,σ : T . From [t-monitor] we deduce Γ12 + Γ14 + Γ23 ` [[v]c,¬σ]e,% : t. From [t-name] and
[t-monitor] we deduce Γ ′22 ` [aι]f,% : T .
Let Γ ′1
def
= Γ10+Γ11+Γ
′
13+ Γ15 and Γ
′
2
def
= Γ20+Γ21+Γ12+ Γ14 + Γ23 +Γ
′
22+ Γ24. From Lemma 8 and
Lemma 4 we deduce Γ ′1 ` E [· · ·] : unit and Γ ′2 ` E ′[· · ·] : unit where we have elided the expressions
in the holes of Q.
Let Γ ′ def= Γ ′1 + Γ
′
2. We derive Γ
′ ` Q with one application of [t-par] and we conclude by observing
that Γ → Γ ′.
Case [R25]. Then P = 〈E [e]〉p → 〈E [e′]〉p = Q where e→ e′. From [t-thread] we deduce Γ ` 〈E [e]〉p :
unit. From Lemma 7 we deduce that there exist Γ1, Γ2, and t such that Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 and Γ1 ` e : t.
From Lemma 6 we deduce Γ1 ` e′ : t. We conclude by Lemma 8 and one application of [r-thread].
Case [R26]. Then P = P1 ‖ P2 → P ′1 ‖ P2 = Q where P1 → P ′1. From [t-par] we deduce Γ = Γ1 + Γ2
and Γi ` Pi for i = 1, 2. By induction hypothesis we derive Γ ′i ` P ′i for some Γ ′1 such that Γ1 →∗ Γ ′1.
By Proposition 6 we deduce that Γ ′1 + Γ2 is defined and we conclude by taking Γ
′ def= Γ ′1 + Γ2 and
one application of [t-par].
Case [R27]. Then P = (νa)P ′ → (νa)P ′′ = Q where P ′ → P ′′. From [t-session] we deduce
Γ , a+ : T, a- : T ` P ′. Note that Γ , a+ : T, a- : T is balanced if so is Γ . By induction hypothesis we
deduce that there exist Γ ′ and S such that Γ , a+ : T, a- : T →∗ Γ ′, a+ : S, a- : S. We conclude with
one application of [t-session].
Case [R28]. Easy consequence of Lemma 9 and the induction hypothesis.
Theorem 1. If Γ :: ω and Γ ` P and P → Q, then Γ ` Q.
Proof. Straightforward corollary of Lemma 10 using the fact that every unlimited type environ-
ment is trivially balanced.
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C Supplement to Section 5
C.1 Properties of 6
Proposition 7. 6 is transitive.
Proof. This is a standard proof using the coinduction principle to show that S
def
= {(e1, e2) | ∃e :
e1 6 e ∧ e 6 e2} ⊆ 6. The result follows easily from the definition of S and Definition 5.
The next result states that entailment is closed under reductions.
Proposition 8. Let e1 6 e2. Then the following properties hold:
1. e1 → e′1 implies e′1 6 e2;
2. e2 → e′2 implies e1 6 e′2.
Proof. An easy consequence of Proposition 5.
We now prove a few results concerning the semantics of dual and define a correspondence ./
akin to duality for session types that relates a contract c with that obtained by evaluating dual c.
Proposition 9. Let dual(·) be the function inductively defined by
dual(flat_c w)
def
= flat_c w
dual(end_c)
def
= end_c
dual(!c;d)
def
= ?c;dual(d)
dual(?c;d)
def
= !c;dual(d)
dual(!c.w)
def
= ?c.λx.dual (wx)
dual(?c.w)
def
= !c.λx.dual (wx)
dual(!c.e:f)
def
= ?c.dual(e):dual(f)
dual(?c.e:f)
def
= !c.dual(e):dual(f)
Then dual c ⇓ dual(c) for every c.
Proof. An easy induction on c.
Definition 11 (duality). We write ./ for the largest relation between expressions such that e1 ./ e2
implies either:
• e1 ⇓ flat_c w and e2 ⇓ flat_c w, or
• e1 ⇓ end_c and e2 ⇓ end_c, or
• e1 ⇓ !c;d and e2 ⇓ ?c;e and d ./ e, or
• e1 ⇓ ?c;d and e2 ⇓ !c;e and d ./ e, or
• e1 ⇓ !flat_c w.w1 and e2 ⇓ ?flat_c w.w2 and w1v ./ w2v for every v ∈ w, or
• e1 ⇓ ?flat_c w.w1 and e2 ⇓ !flat_c w.w2 and w1v ./ w2v for every v ∈ w, or
• e1 ⇓ !c.d:e and e2 ⇓ ?c.f:g and d ./ f and e ./ g, or
• e1 ⇓ ?c.d:e and e2 ⇓ !c.f:g and d ./ f and e ./ g.
Informally, two contracts c1 and c2 are compatible if every output in ci is matched by a
corresponding input in c3−i and the contract in the input prefix of c3−i is entailed by the contract
in the corresponding output prefix of ci. The continuation of dependent contracts is obtained just
like in the case of entailment.
The formal relationship between the semantics of dual and the relation ./ is stated by the
following proposition:
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Proposition 10. If e 6 e, then e ./ dual e.
Proof. It is enough to show that the relation R defined by
R
def
= {(e, e′) | ∃c : c 6 c ∧ e ⇓ c ∧ e′ ⇓ dual(c)}
is included in ./. Suppose e R e′. From the definition of R we know that there exists c such that
c 6 c and e ⇓ c and e′ ⇓ dual(c). We reason by cases on the shape of c, discussing only some
representative cases.
Case c = flat_c w. We conclude by observing that dual(c) = flat_c w.
Case c = end_c. We conclude by observing that dual(c) = end_c.
Case c = ?d;e. Then dual(c) = !d;dual(e). From the hypothesis c 6 c we deduce e 6 e. We
conclude by observing that e R dual(e) by definition of R.
Case c = ?d.w. Then dual(c) = !d.λx.dual (wx). From the hypothesis c 6 c we deduce
d = flat_c w′ for some w′ and wv 6 wv for every v ∈ w′. Take v ∈ w′. Then there exists
c′ such that wv ⇓ c′. Now we derive (λx.dual (wx))v → dual (wv) ⇓ dual(c′), therefore
wv R (λx.dual (wx))v by definition of R.
C.2 Monitor Invariants
We prove an invariant property of the big-step semantics of λCoS, as introduced in Section 3, which
is instrumental in several proofs that follow. We formalize the notion of balanced process, one in
which the innermost monitors associated with dual endpoints have dual contracts and symmetric
pair of blame labels.
Definition 12 (balanced process). We say that P is balanced if P ⊃ [aι]e1,σ and P ⊃ [aι]e2,%
imply e1 ./ e2 and σ = ¬%.
The following results show that the property of being balanced is preserved by reductions of
the big-step semantics.
Lemma 11. Let Γ ` e : t. If 〈e〉p ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and e→ e′ then 〈e′〉p ⊃ [aι]e
′
1,p,q and e1 →∗ e′1.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of e→ e′.
Lemma 12. Let Γ ` P and Γ balanced. If P is balanced and P → Q and Q ⊃ [aι]e2,p,q, then
either
1. P ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and P 6⊃ aι and Q 6⊃ aι and e1 →∗ e2;
2. P ⊃ [aι]_,_,_ and P ⊃ [aι]_,_,_ and Q ⊃ [aι]e1,q,p and e1 ./ e2;
3. P 6⊃ aι and P 6⊃ aι and Q ⊃ [aι]e1,q,p and e1 ./ e2.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of P → Q and by cases on the last rule applied. We analyze
some representative cases.
Case [R15]. Then,
P = 〈E [connect b]〉p ‖ b⇐cq v
Q = (νc)(〈E [[c+]c,q,p]〉p ‖ 〈(v [c-]dual c,p,q)〉q) ‖ b⇐cq v
where c is fresh. We proceed by cases:
1. Assume P ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and P 6⊃ aι. Since Γ ` P , both v and c do not contain runtime syntax.
Hence, 〈E [connect b]〉p ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and 〈E [connect b]〉p 6⊃ aι. Since c is fresh, c 6= a.
Therefore, 〈E [[c+]c,q,p]〉p ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and 〈E [[c+]c,q,p]〉p 6⊃ aι. The proof is completed by
taking e1 = e2.
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2. Assume P ⊃ [aι]e2,p,q and P ⊃ [aι]e1,r,s. Since P is balanced, e1 ./ e2 and p = s
and q = r. As in the previous case, we conclude that 〈E [[c+]c,q,p]〉p ⊃ [aι]e2,p,q and
〈E [[c+]c,q,p]〉p ⊃ [aι]e1,q,p.
3. Assume P 6⊃ aι and P 6⊃ aι. Hence, a = c. Then, the proof is completed by using
Proposition 10 to conclude c ./ dual c.
Case [R16]. Then
P = (νc)(〈E [close [c+]end_c,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[close [c-]end_c,%]〉q)
Q = 〈E [()]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[()]〉q
The two first cases follow analogously to rule [R15]. The third case is not possible.
Case [R17]. Then,
P = 〈E [send v [cι]!c;d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive [cι]?e;f,%]〉q
Q = 〈E [[cι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[cι]f,%)]〉q
If a 6= c, then the proof follows as for the case 1 in rule [R15]. Otherwise, when a = c, we are
on case P ⊃ aι and P ⊃ aι. We know that !c;d ./ ?e;f and σ = ¬% because P is balanced.
Consequently, d ./ f by duality.
Case [R25]. Then, P = 〈e〉p and Q = 〈e′〉p and e→ e′. Since Γ ` P , P ⊃ aι if and only if Q ⊃ aι.
Then, we have the following two cases:
1. If P ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and P 6⊃ aι, then the proof follows from Lemma 11.
2. If P ⊃ [aι]_,_,_ and P ⊃ [aι]_,_,_, then P ⊃ [aι]e3,r,s and P ⊃ [aι]e4,s,r and e3 ./ e4
because P is balanced. By Lemma 11, Q ⊃ [aι]e1,s,r and e3 →∗ e1. Similarly, P ⊃ [aι]e2,s,r
and e4 →∗ e2. By Lemma 5, e3 ⇓ c implies e1 ⇓ c, and e4 ⇓ d implies e2 ⇓ d. Therefore,
e1 ./ e2 implies e3 ./ e4.
Case [R26]. Then, P = R1 ‖ R2 and Q = R′1 ‖ R2 and R1 → R′1. Lemma 10, ensures that there
exists Γ ′ such that Γ ′ ` Q. Moreover, P balanced implies R1 and R2 balanced as well. Firstly, we
consider the case R′1 ⊃ [aι]e2,p,q. By induction hypothesis we have one of the following cases.
1. R1 ⊃ [aι]e1,p,q and R1 6⊃ aι and R′1 6⊃ aι and e1 →∗ e2. Note that R2 6⊃ aι because P is
well-typed. If R2 6⊃ aι, we are done because Q 6⊃ aι. Otherwise, when R2 ⊃ [aι]e3,r,s, P
balanced implies e1 ./ e3 and p = s and q = r. Since e1 →∗ e2, e1 ⇓ c implies e2 ⇓ c. Hence,
e1 ./ e3 implies e2 ./ e3.
2. R1 ⊃ [aι]_,_,_ and R1 ⊃ [aι]_,_,_ and R′1 ⊃ [aι]e1,q,p and e1 ./ e2. Moreover, R2 6⊃ aι.
because Q is well-typed.
3. R1 6⊃ aι and R1 6⊃ aι and R′1 ⊃ [aι]e1,q,p and e1 ./ e2. Moreover R2 6⊃ aι because Q is
well-typed.
Now we consider the case R2 ⊃ [aι]e2,p,q. Since P is well-typed, R1 6⊃ aι. We proceed by
cases:
1. Assume R2 ⊃ aι. Then, it follows straightforwardly because P is balanced.
2. Assume R1 ⊃ aι. The case is completed by using induction hypothesis on R1 → R′1 and by
noting that only case 1 is applicable because R1 6⊃ aι.
3. Assume R1 6⊃ aι and R2 6⊃ aι. Therefore, P 6⊃ aι. Since Q is well-typed, it cannot be
the case that R′1 ⊃ aι and R′1 ⊃ aι. Consequently, Q 6⊃ aι. Then, P ⊃ [aι]e2,p,q and
e2 →∗ e2.
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Lemma 13. Let Γ ` P where Γ is balanced. If P is balanced and P →∗ Q, then Q is balanced as
well.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation and using Lemma 12 to conclude that P → Q
and P balanced imply Q balanced.
C.3 Blame Soundness
Definition 13 (reachable expressions and processes). We say that Q is reachable if there exists
a user process P such that P →∗ Q. We say that e is reachable if there exists a reachable process
P ⊃ e.
We introduce the syntactic category of monitored expressions as a generalization of monitored
endpoints:
Monitored Expression e¯ ::= v | blame p | v /p e | [e¯]e,σ
This category allows us to focus on a small class of expressions that can be wrapped by a
monitor. Indeed, it is possible to show that all expressions wrapped by a monitor in a reduct of a
user process are monitored expressions:
Lemma 14. If P is a reachable process and P ⊃ [e]_,_,_, then e is a monitored expression.
Proof. An easy inspection of the definition of →.
We now introduce a generalization of Definition 7 that is necessary in order to prove blame
soundness. The main difference between the two definitions is that contracts occurring in monitors
are not required to be values, but they can be expressions that need to be evaluated. Also, the
process is assumed to be reachable.
Definition 14 (generalized module soundness). Let P be a reachable process. We say that module
p is sound in P if:
1. P ⊃ v /p e implies e ⇓ true;
2. P ⊃ [v]e0,p,_ and e0 ⇓ flat_c w imply v ∈ w;
3. P ⊃ [v /_ e]e0,p,_ and e ⇓ true and e0 ⇓ flat_c w imply v ∈ w;
4. P ⊃ [[_]e1,_,q]e2,r,_ and p ∈ {q, r} imply e1 6 e2;
We say that p is sound in e if p is sound in 〈e〉p.
We can now proceed with the results showing that (generalized) soundness is preserved by
reductions. To keep the proofs manageable, we split the results for expressions and processes.
Lemma 15. Let Γ ` E [e] : t where E [e] is reachable. If p is sound in E [e] and e → e′, then p is
sound also in E [e′].
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of E and by cases on its shape.
Case E = [ ]. We distinguish several sub-cases, depending on the reduction rule used for deriving
e→ e′.
If [R1] is used, then e = (λx.e′′)v → e′′{v/x} = e′. This rule cannot generate monitored
expressions that were not already present in e because x, which is being replaced by v, is not a
monitored expression. The sub-cases in which one of [R2–R4] is used are analogous.
If [R5] is used, then e = [v]flat_c w,p,_ → v /p wv = e′. From the hypothesis that p is sound in
e we deduce v ∈ w, hence we conclude wv ⇓ true and condition 1 of Definition 14 is satisfied.
The rules [R6–R7] eliminate one busy monitor, hence they do not generate new monitored
expressions.
Finally, none of the rules [R8–R14] generates or affects monitored expressions.
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Case E = [E ′]e0,q,r. By induction hypothesis we deduce that p is sound in E ′[e′]. We now
consider the possibilities in which the reduct matches one of the sub-expressions in the conditions
of Definition 14. In doing so, recall that E ′[e] must be a monitored expression by Lemma 14 and
that it cannot be a value or a blame because e→ e′ by hypothesis.
Regarding condition 2, suppose q = p and E ′[e] = v /_ true→ v. From the hypothesis that p
is sound in E [e] we conclude that e0 ⇓ flat_c w implies v ∈ w.
Regarding condition 3, suppose q = p and that E ′[e] = [v]flat_c w,_,_ → v /_ wv. From the
hypothesis that p is sound in E [e] we deduce that flat_c w 6 e0. From the definition of 6 we
deduce e0 ⇓ flat_c w′ and v ∈ w implies v ∈ w′. Hence we conclude that wv ⇓ true implies
v ∈ w′.
Regarding condition 3, suppose q = p and E ′ = v /_ E ′′ and E ′′[e] → E ′′[e′]. From the
hypothesis that p is sound in E [e] we deduce that E ′′[e] ⇓ true and e0 ⇓ flat_c w imply v ∈ w.
We conclude that E ′′[e′] ⇓ true and e0 ⇓ flat_c w imply v ∈ w.
Regarding condition 4, suppose that E ′ = [E ′′]e1,_,r and p ∈ {q, r}. From the hypothesis that
p is sound in E [e] we conclude that e1 6 e0.
Regarding condition 4, suppose that E ′ = [v]E
′′,_,r and p ∈ {q, r} and E ′′[e] → E ′′[e′]. From
the hypothesis that p is sound in E [e] we deduce E ′′[e] 6 e0. We conclude E ′′[e′] 6 e0 by
Proposition 8.
Case E = [v]E
′,q,_. By induction hypothesis we deduce that p is sound in E ′[e′]. We now
consider the possibilities in which the reduct matches one of the sub-expressions in the conditions
of Definition 14.
Regarding condition 2, suppose q = p. From the hypothesis that p is sound in E [e] we deduce
that E ′[e] ⇓ flat_c w implies v ∈ w. We conclude by observing that E ′[e] ⇓ flat_c w implies
E ′[e′] ⇓ flat_c w.
Regarding condition 4, suppose that v = [_]v0,_,r and p ∈ {q, r}. From the hypothesis that p
is sound in E [e] we deduce that v0 6 E ′[e]. We conclude v0 6 E ′[e′] by Proposition 8.
Case E = v /q E ′. By induction hypothesis we deduce that p is sound in E ′[e′]. Regarding
condition 2, suppose q = p. From the hypothesis that p is sound in E [e] we deduce that E ′[e] ⇓
true, hence we conclude E ′[e′] ⇓ true.
Cases E = E ′e or E = vE ′ or E = let x,y = E ′ in e0 or E = case E ′ of e1 | e2. The result
follows immediately by the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 16. Let Γ ` P where Γ is balanced. If p is locally correct and sound in P and P → Q,
then p is sound also in Q.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of P → Q and by cases on the last rule applied. From the
hypothesis Γ ` P and Theorem 1 we deduce that Γ ′ ` Q for some Γ ′ such that Γ →∗ Γ ′.
Case [R15]. Then
• P = 〈E [connect a]〉q ‖ a⇐cr v and
• Q = (νb)(〈E [[b+]c,r,q]〉q ‖ 〈(v [b-]dual c,q,r)〉r) ‖ a⇐cr v.
Concerning condition 2 of Definition 14, suppose q = p. From Γ ′ ` Q, [t-par], [t-session], and
Lemma 7 we deduce that there exist Γ1, Γ2, and T such that Γ1 ` [b+]c,q,p : T . From [t-monitor]
and the type scheme of flat_c we deduce that c cannot be of the form flat_c w, because T is
linear. Therefore, condition 2 holds vacuously. A similar reasoning applies if r = p.
Case [R16]. This reduction only eliminates monitored expressions, hence there is nothing to discuss.
Case [R17]. Then
• P = 〈E [send v [aι]!c;d,σ ]〉q ‖ 〈E ′[receive [aι]?e;f,%]〉r and
• Q = 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉q ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉r.
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Let n ≥ 1 be the number of monitors around the endpoint aι and m ≥ 1 be the number of
monitors around the endpoint aι. By Proposition 1 we know that q is negative in σn and that r
is negative in %m. We now discuss the conditions of Definition 14 that may apply because of the
monitored expressions that have been generated or affected by the reduction.
Suppose σn = _, p. We distinguish two sub-cases, according to whether v is a monitored
endpoint or not. In the first sub-case we have v = [_]c,_,p, hence Q ⊃ [[_]c,_,p]cn,p,_. From the
hypothesis that p is locally correct in P we deduce c 6 cn, therefore condition 4 is satisfied by
this monitored expression. In the second sub-case we have cn = flat_c w for some w. From the
hypothesis that p is locally correct in P we deduce v ∈ w, therefore condition 2 is satisfied by this
monitored expression.
Suppose that Q ⊃ [[_]ci+1,_,q0]ci,r0,_ and p ∈ {q0, r0} for some 1 ≤ i < n. Then P ⊃
[[_]!ci;di,_,r0]!ci+1;di+1,q0,_. From the hypothesis that p is sound in P we deduce !ci;di 6
!ci+1;di+1. From the definition of 6 we deduce ci+1 6 ci, therefore condition 4 is satisfied for
this monitored expression. Analogous arguments can be used to verify that condition 4 is satisfied
also for Q ⊃ [[_]di,_,q0]di+1,r0,_ and Q ⊃ [[_]ei,_,q0]ei+1,r0,_ and Q ⊃ [[_]fi,_,q0]fi+1,r0,_ when
p ∈ {q0, r0}.
From Lemma 13 we deduce !c1;d1 ./ ?e1;f1. By definition of ./, we deduce c1 6 e1 and d1 ./
f1. Also, suppose that Q ⊃ [[_]c1,_,q0]e1,r0,_ where p ∈ {q0, r0}. We have already established
that c1 6 e1, therefore condition 4 is satisfied by this monitored expression.
Cases [R18–R20]. These cases are analogous to [R17].
Case [R25]. Straightforward consequence of Lemma 15.
Cases [R26–R28]. All these cases are proved with a straightforward application of the induction
hypothesis. In the case of [R28], observe that structural congruence does not affect expressions,
hence monitored expressions in particular.
Lemma 1. If Γ ` P where Γ :: ω and p is locally correct and sound in P and P → Q, then p is
sound also in Q.
Proof. This is a particular instance of Lemma 16, since every unlimited Γ is trivially balanced.
Theorem 2. If Γ ` P where P is a user process and p is locally correct in P , then P →∗ Q
implies blame p 6⊂ Q.
Proof. Observe that Γ must be unlimited for a user process has no (free) endpoints. Also, p
is trivially sound in P for P is a user a process with no (busy) monitors in it. Suppose by
contradiction that P →∗ Q ⊃ blame p. The only reduction that generates a blame p term is [R7],
hence there must exist Q′ such that
P →∗ Q′ →∗ Q ⊃ blame p
and Q′ ⊃ v /p false. This is absurd, because by Lemma 1 we deduce that p is sound in Q′.
C.4 Reduction of Example 2
Let P be the parallel composition of the two services q and r and the client p of Example 2.
Tables 6 and 7 shows the relevant reduction steps of P .
D Supplement to Section 6
D.1 Single-Sided Monitoring
The following definition provides a characterization of the redundancy present on monitored ex-
pressions when wrapped by several monitors. In what follows we say that an expression is a user
expression if it does not contain runtime syntax.
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P → (νc)

〈(let x1 = [c+]c,q,p in
let y1,x2 = receive x1 in
let y2 = send 0 y1 in
close x2;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(λx1.let y1 = connect b in
let x2 = send y1 x1 in
close x2)[c
-]c,p,q〉q

→∗ (νc)

〈(let y1,x2 = receive [c+]c,q,p in
let y2 = send 0 y1 in
close x2;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(let y1 = connect b in
let x2 = send y1 [c
-]c,p,q in
close x2)〉q

→∗ (νc)(νd)

〈(let y1,x2 = receive [c+]c,q,p in
let y2 = send 0 y1 in
close x2;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(let y1 = [d+]d,r,q in
let x2 = send y1 [c
-]c,p,q in
close x2)〉q
‖〈(λy1.let z,y2 = receive y1 in
print z−1;
close y2)[d
-]d,q,r〉r

→∗ (νc)(νd)

〈(let y1,x2 = receive [c+]c,q,p in
let y2 = send 0 y1 in
close x2;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(let x2 = send [d+]d,r,q [c-]c,p,q in
close x2)〉q
‖〈(let z,y2 = receive [d-]d,q,r in
print z−1;
close y2)〉r

Table 6: Reduction of the system described in Example 2.
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→∗ (νc)(νd)

〈(let y1,x2 = ([[[d+]d,r,q]e,q,p]e,q,p,[c+]end_c,q,p) in
let y2 = send 0 y1 in
close x2;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(let x2 = [c-]end_c,p,q in
close x2)〉q
‖〈(let z,y2 = receive [d-]d,q,r in
print z−1;
close y2)〉r

→∗ (νc)(νd)

〈(let y2 = send 0 [[[d+]d,r,q]e,q,p]e,q,p in
close [c+]end_c,q,p;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(close [c-]end_c,p,q)〉q
‖〈(let z,y2 = receive [d-]d,q,r in
print z−1;
close y2)〉r

→∗ (νc)(νd)

〈(let y2 = [[[d+]end_c,r,q]end_c,q,p]end_c,q,p in
close [c+]end_c,q,p;
close y2)〉p
‖〈(close [c-]end_c,p,q)〉q
‖〈(let z,y2 = ([[[[0]any_c,p,q]any_c,p,q]f,q,r]f,q,r,[d-]end_c,q,r) in
print z−1;
close y2)〉r

→∗ (νc)(νd)

〈(close [c+]end_c,q,p;
close [[[d+]end_c,r,q]end_c,q,p]end_c,q,p)〉p
‖〈(close [c-]end_c,p,q)〉q
‖〈(let z,y2 = ([[0]f,q,r]f,q,r,[d-]end_c,q,r) in
print z−1;
close y2)〉r

→∗ (νd)

〈(close [[[d+]end_c,r,q]end_c,q,p]end_c,q,p)〉p
‖〈()〉q
‖〈(let z,y2 = ([blame q]f,q,r,[d-]end_c,q,r) in
print z−1;
close y2)〉r

Table 7: Reduction of the system described in Example 2 (cont.).
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Definition 15. A monitored expression is well-stacked if it has one of the following forms:
• v is a user expression.
• [blame p]_,_,_,
• [v /p e]flat_c w,p,_ and v and w are user expressions and e ⇓ v′ if and only if wv ⇓ v′,
• [aι]_,_,_,
• [[e¯]c,p,q]c,p,q and e¯ is well-stacked.
The definition extends homomorphically over (unmonitored) expressions and processes.
The single-sided monitoring semantics avoids the redundancy in well-stacked monitored ex-
pressions by removing one duplicated monitor, as formalized by the following erasure function.
Definition 16 (Monitor Erasure). The erasure of monitors from well-stacked monitored expres-
sions is defined as follows.
erase(v) = v
erase([blame p]_,_,_) = blame p
erase([v /p e]_,_,_) = v /p e
erase([a-]_,_,_) = a-
erase([a+]e,p,q) = [a+]e,p,q
erase([[e¯]c,p,q]c,_,_) = [erase(e¯)]c,p,q
We also write erase(_) for the homomorphic extension to expressions and processes.
We now show that substitution and replacement within contexts of well-stacked expressions
produce well-stacked expressions.
Lemma 17. Let e and v be well-stacked expressions. Then,
1. e{v/x} is well-stacked.
2. erase(e{v/x}) = erase(e){erase(v)/x}.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
Lemma 18. If e and e′ and E [e] are well-stacked, then E [e′] is well-stacked.
Proof. By induction on the structure of E . The only interesting case is E = [E ′]e1,σ. Since, E [e]
and e are well-stacked, by case analysis we conclude that the only possibility is E ′ = [E ′′]e1,σ
with e1 = c. Then, it is immediate that E [e′] is well-stacked.
The following auxiliary result shows that a sub-expression obtained after applying the erasure
function to a well-stacked expression corresponds to the result of applying the erasure function to
a well-stacked sub-expression of the original expression.
Lemma 19. Let e be a well-stacked expression. If erase(e) = E [e′] then there exist E ′ and e′′
well-stacked such that e = E ′[e′′] and e′ = erase(e′′).
Proof. We proceed by induction on e.
Case e = v. Then, erase(e) = e. If suffices to take E = E ′ and e′ = e′′.
Case e = x. It follows analogously to the previous case.
Case e = e1e2. Then, erase(e) = erase(e1)erase(e2). Therefore, either erase(e) = E ′′[e′1]erase(e2)
or erase(e) = erase(e1)E ′′[e′2]. Both cases follow by using induction hypothesis.
Cases e = let x,y = e1 in e2 or e = case e of e1 | e2. They follow as in the previous case.
Case e = [e1]
e2,p,q. Since e2 is a user expression, erase(e2) = e2. We proceed by case analysis on
e1.
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• e1 = blame p. Then, e = [blame p]e2,p,q and erase(e) = blame p. Hence, E = [ ] and e′ = e1.
Take E ′ = [ ] and e′′ = e and note that erase(e′′) = e1.
• e1 = v /p e3 where e2 = flat_c w. Then e = [v /p e3]e2,p,q and erase(e) = v /p e3. If E = [ ],
then the proof follows as in the previous case. Otherwise, E = v /p E ′′. Take E ′ = [E ]e2,p,q
and e′′ = e′. Note that e′′ is well-stacked because e1 is well-stacked.
• e1 = a+. Then, e = [a+]e2,p,q and erase(e) = e. Take E ′ = [ ] and e′′ = e.
• e1 = a-. Then, e = [a-]e2,p,q erase(e) = e1. Take E ′ = [ ] and e′′ = e.
• e1 = [e¯]c,p,q. Then, e = [[e¯]c,p,q]c,p,q and erase(e) = [erase(e¯)]c,p,q. If E = [ ], then the
proof follows as in the previous cases. Otherwise, E = [E ′′]c,p,q and erase(e) = [E ′′[e′]]c,p,q
with erase(e¯) = E ′′[e′]. By induction hypothesis, e¯ = E ′′′[e′′] and e′ = erase(e′′) with e′′
well-stacked. The proof is completed by taking E ′′ = [[E ′′′]c,p,q]c,p,q.
Case e = v /p e1. It is not possible because e is not a well-stacked expression.
Case e = blame p. It is not possible because e is not a well-stacked expression.
The following two results show that a reduction step of the one-side monitoring semantics
is simulated by possibly many reduction steps of the big-step semantics. Several reductions are
needed when evaluating redundant monitors.
Lemma 20. If Γ ` e : t and e is well-stacked and erase(e) 7→ e′, then e→∗ e′′ and e′ = erase(e′′).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of erase(e) 7→ e′.
Case [R1]. Then, erase(e) = (λx.e0)v 7→ e0{v/x} = e′. Moreover, e = (λx.e1)w with e0 =
erase(e1) and v = erase(w). Then, e → e1{w/x} = e′′. Note that e1 and w are well-stacked
because e is well-stacked. Then, e′ = erase(e′′) because of Lemma 17.
Cases [R2] – [R4]. Follow analogously to [R1].
Case [R5]. Then, erase(e) = [v]e0,p,q and e0 = flat_c w. Therefore, erase(e) 7→ v /p wv = e′.
Since e is well-stacked,
e = [[v]e0,p,q]e0,p,q
Hence, e → [v /p wv]e0,p,q = e′′. Since e0 = flat_c w, it trivially holds that wv ⇓ v′ if and
only if wv ⇓ v′. Hence, e′′ is well-stacked and e′ = erase(e′′).
Case [R6]. erase(e) = v /p true 7→ v = e′. Since e is well-stacked, e = [v /p true]e0,p,_ and
e0 = flat_c w and wv ⇓ true. Then,
e → [v]flat_c w,p,q → v /p wv →∗ v = e′′.
Hence, e′ = erase(e′′).
Case [R7]. erase(e) = v /p false 7→ blame p = e′. Since e is well-stacked,
e = [v /p false]_,_,_ → [blame p]_,_,_ = e′′
Hence, e′ = erase(e′′).
Cases [R8] – [R14]. Follow straightforwardly.
Lemma 21. Let Γ ` P where Γ is balanced. If P is balanced and well-stacked and erase(P ) 7→ Q,
then P →∗ Q′ and Q = erase(Q′).
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of erase(P ) 7→ Q.
Case [R21]. erase(P ) = 〈E [connect a]〉p ‖ a⇐cq v 7→ Q with
Q = (νc)(〈E [[c+]c,q,p]〉p ‖ 〈(v c-)〉q) ‖ a⇐cq v
Moreover, P = 〈E ′[connect a]〉p ‖ a⇐cq v and P → Q′ with
Q′ = (νc)(〈E ′[[c+]c,q,p]〉p ‖ 〈(v [c-]dual c,p,q)〉q) ‖ a⇐cq v
Since P is well-stacked, E ′ 6= E ′′[[[ ]]_,_,_]. Moreover, service definitions do not have runtime
syntax and hence v is also well-stacked. Then, Q′ is well-stacked and Q = erase(Q′).
Case [R17]. erase(P ) 7→ Q with
erase(P ) = 〈E1[send v [aι]!c;d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E2[receive [aι]?e;f,%]〉q
Q = 〈E1[[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E2[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q
Moreover, P → Q′ where
P = 〈E ′1[send v [aι]!c
′;d′,σ′ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′2[receive [aι]?e
′;f′,%′ ]〉q
Q′ = 〈E ′1[[aι]d
′,σ′ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′2[([[v]c
′,¬σ′]e
′,%′,[aι]f
′,%′)]〉q
Since P is well-stacked, E ′i 6= E ′′i [[[ ]]_,_,_] for i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, Q′ is well-stacked if [aι]d
′,σ′
and [[v]c
′,¬σ′]e
′,%′ and [aι]f
′,%′ are well-stacked. The subterms [aι]d
′,σ′ and [aι]f
′,%′ are well-
stacked because [aι]!c
′;d′,σ′ and [aι]?e
′;f′,%′ are so. It remains to show that [[v]c
′,¬σ′]e
′,%′ is
well-stacked. Since P is well-stacked, v is well-stacked. By Lemma 13, !c′0;d
′
0 ./ ?e
′
0;f
′
0 and
¬σ0 = %0. By duality, c0 = e0. Hence, [[v]c
′,¬σ′]e
′,%′ is well-stacked.
Case [R25]. Then, erase(P ) = 〈erase(e)〉p and P 7→ 〈e′〉p = Q with e 7→ e′. By Lemma 20, e 7→ e′
implies e→∗ e′′ and e′ = erase(e′′). Hence, P = 〈e〉p →∗ 〈e′′〉p = Q′ and Q = erase(Q′).
Case [R26]. Then, P = R1 ‖ R2 and erase(P ) = erase(R1) ‖ erase(R2) and erase(R1) 7→ R′1 and
Q = R′1 ‖ erase(R2). By induction hypothesis on erase(R1) 7→ R′1, we have R1 →∗ R′′1 and
R′1 = erase(R
′′
1 ). Therefore, P →∗ R′′1 ‖R2 = Q′ and Q = erase(Q′).
Lemma 22. If P is a user process and P 7→∗ Q, then there exists Q′ such that P →∗ Q′ and
Q = erase(Q′).
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the length of the derivation P 7→∗ Q. For the base case,
i.e., P = Q, the proof follows by noting that P is a user process and hence it is well-stacked. Then,
take Q′ = P . For the induction step we consider P 7→n R 7→ Q. By induction hypothesis, there
exists R′ such that P →∗ R′ and R = erase(R′). Note that R′ is well-stacked because erase(R′) is
defined. Additionally, R′ is balanced, because of Lemma 13. By Lemma 21, R 7→ Q implies that
there exists Q′ such that P →∗ Q′ and Q = erase(Q′).
Proposition 2. Let 7→ be the relation defined by the rules in Tables 2 and 3 except that [R15] is
replaced by [R21]. If P is a user process and P 7→∗⊃ blame p, then P →∗⊃ blame p.
Proof. By Lemma 22, P 7→∗ Q implies P →∗ R such that erase(R) = Q. By definition of erase(_),
Q ⊃ blame p implies R ⊃ blame p.
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[R22] send v [ε]!c;d,σ  [send [v]c,¬σ ε]d,σ
[R23] receive [ε]?c;d,σ  let x,y = receive ε
in ([x]c,σ,[y]d,σ)
[R32] send v [ε]!c.w,σ  [send [v]c,¬σ ε]wv,σ
[R33] receive [ε]?c.w,σ  let x,y = receive ε
in ([x]c,σ,[y]wx,σ)
[R34] left [ε]!c.d:e,σ  [(λ_.left ε)[true]c,¬σ]d,σ
[R35] right [ε]!c.d:e,σ  [(λ_.right ε)[false]c,¬σ]e,σ
[R36] branch [ε]?c.d:e,σ  case branch ε of
λx.(λ_.inl [x]d,σ)[true]c,σ
| λx.(λ_.inr [x]e,σ)[false]c,σ
[R37] close [ε]end_c,σ  close ε
Table 8: Small-step reduction of expressions.
[R38] (νa)(〈E [close a+]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[close a-]〉q)  〈E [()]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[()]〉q
[R24] 〈E [send v aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive aι]〉q  〈E [aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[(v,aι)]〉q
[R39] 〈E [left aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[branch aι]〉q  〈E [aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[inl aι]〉q
[R40] 〈E [right aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[branch aι]〉q  〈E [aι]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[inr aι]〉q
Table 9: Small-step reduction of processes.
D.2 Small-Step Monitoring
We start by reporting the reduction rules for the small-step semantics of our implementation.
We added the rules in Tables 8 and 9 to the original rules for expressions in Table 2. In this
section we show that the small-step semantics assigns the same blames as the big-step semantics
in configurations in which two threads are about to communicate.
The following auxiliary result states that the two semantics coincide when evaluating monitored
expressions. This is is an immediate consequence of the fact that the small-step semantics does
not change the evaluation rules for monitored expressions.
Lemma 23. Let e¯ be a monitored expression. Then, e¯ e¯′ implies e¯→ e¯′.
Proof. By straightforward induction on the structure of e¯.
The small-step semantics applies monitors one at a time. Additionally, flat contracts are
evaluated by the sender before the communication takes place. The next two results characterize
the configurations that can be reached when evaluating send v ε, depending on whether the
involved contracts are flat or not.
Lemma 24. Let P
def
= send v [aι]!c;d,σ . If ci 6= flat_c _, then P  ∗ [send [v]c,¬σ aι]d,σ .
Proof. By induction on the number of stacked monitors.
Lemma 25. Let P
def
= send v [aι]!c;d,σ . If ci = flat_c wi, then either
• P  ∗ send v aι and v ∈ wi for all i.
• P  ∗⊃ blame p and there exists i such that v 6∈ wi and σi = p, _ and v ∈ wj for all j < i.
Proof. By induction on the number of stacked monitors.
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Analogously, monitors on the receiver side are applied incrementally. We first characterize the
configurations that are reachable from the expression receive ε. We use the auxiliary notation
let?c;d,σ e defined below.
let?c;d,σ e = let x,y = e in ([x]c,σ,[y]d,σ)
let?c;d,σ e = let x,y = let?e;f,% e in ([x]cn,σn,[y]dn,σn)
with % = σ0, . . . , σn−1 and e = c0, . . . ,cn−1, and f = d0, . . . ,dn−1.
Lemma 26. receive [aι]?c;d,σ  ∗ let?c;d,σ receive aι.
Proof. By induction on the number of stacked monitors.
Now we show the possible reductions for the receiver soon after the communication takes place.
Also, the reachable configurations depend on whether contracts are flat or not.
Lemma 27. Let P
def
= let?c;d,σ (v,w). If ci 6= flat_c _, then P  ∗ ([v]c,σ,[w]d,σ).
Proof. By induction on the number of stacked monitors.
Lemma 28. Let P
def
= let?c;d,σ (v,w). If ci = flat_c wi, then either
• P  ∗ (v,[w]d,σ) and v ∈ wi for all i.
• P  ∗⊃ blame p and there exists i such that v 6∈ wi and σi = p, _ and v ∈ wj for all j < i.
Proof. By induction on the number of stacked monitors.
Finally, we state the following auxiliary result for the reductions of a monitored value in the
big-step semantics.
Lemma 29. Let P
def
= [v]c,σ . If ci = flat_c wi, then either
• P →∗ v and v ∈ wi for all i.
• P →∗⊃ blame p and there exists i such that v 6∈ wi and σi = p, _ and v ∈ wj for all j < i.
Proof. By induction on the number of stacked monitors.
Proposition 3. If
P
def
= 〈E [send v [aι]!c;d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive[aι]?e;f,%]〉q
Q1
def
= 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[(v,[aι]f,%)]〉q
Q2
def
= 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q
then either
1. P  ∗ Q and P →∗ Q for some Q ∈ {Q1, Q2}, or
2. P  ∗⊃ blame r and Q→∗⊃ blame r for some r, or
Proof. There are two cases:
• ci 6= flat_c wi. By Lemma 24,
P  ∗ 〈E [[send [v]c,¬σ aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive[aι]?e;f,%]〉q
By Lemma 26
P  ∗ 〈E [[send [v]c,¬σ aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[let?e;f,σ receive aι]〉q
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By rule [R24],
P  ∗ 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[let?e;f,σ ([v]c,¬σ,aι)]〉q
By Lemma 27
P  ∗ 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q = Q2
Moreover, P → Q2 by rule [R17].
• ci = flat_c wi. By Lemma 25,
– If v ∈ wi for all i.
P  ∗ 〈E [[send v aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[receive[aι]?e;f,%]〉q
By Lemma 26
P  ∗ 〈E [[send v aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[let?e;f,σ receive aι]〉q
By rule [R24],
P  ∗ 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[let?e;f,σ (v,aι)]〉q = P1
By rule [R17].
P → 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([[v]c,¬σ]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q
By Lemma 29,
P → 〈E [[aι]d,σ ]〉p ‖ 〈E ′[([v]e,%,[aι]f,%)]〉q = P2
By Lemmata 28 and 29, we conclude that one of the following holds
∗ P1  ∗ Q1 and P2 →∗ Q1;
∗ P1  ∗⊃ blame p and P2 →∗⊃ blame p;
– There exists i such that v 6∈ wi and σi = p, _ and v ∈ wj for all j < i. Then,
P  ∗⊃ blame p. It follows as in the previous case that P →∗⊃ blame p.
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